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I  INTRODUCTION:  SELIGMAN’S READING OF BAILEY AND ITS RECEPTION 
  Professor Edwin Seligman hoped by his study of “neglected” British economists “to call 
attention to some of the British writers who undertook to discuss economic theory during the 
two decades following the appearance of Ricardo’s Principles.  It will perhaps surprise many 
to find in this literature so much that foreshadows the most recent contributions to economic 
doctrine” (1903: 336).  Samuel Bailey’s Critical Dissertation on Value (1825) – written 
anonymously in reply to the formulation of Ricardian theory in De Quincey’s Templars’ 
Dialogue (1824) shows the author, Seligman maintained, to be one of the “more acute 
critic[s] of Ricardo” (352), a “keen and fertile thinker,” having in mind “[t]he opposition to 
the labour theory of value, the emphasis put on time as an element in value, the broadening of 
the rent concept, the criticism of the statement that rent does not enter into price, and the 
importance assigned to productivity in affecting value – all these constitute doctrines of 
importance in the recent phases of the science” (355; also 534).  For convenience, the full 
case is recorded in Appendix A.  Seligman makes no mention of Bailey’s varieties of 
imperfect competition and barriers to entry that (we shall see) impressed other commentators. 
  Note should be taken of Seligman’s brief remark in concluding his summary of Bailey’s 
achievements:  “That they should have been enunciated in 1825 and then seemingly forgotten 
is eloquent testimony to the power which is sometimes exerted by a few great names in 
silencing for a time all criticisms, however sound they may be” (355).  Seligman’s 
contribution ends on this theme.  His answer to the question “How does it happen that all 
these authors have been so largely overlooked and neglected?” is that “[t]heir views were not 
in accord with those of the dominant school” (534); that “[t]he reputation of the great names 
was such that any deviation from accepted doctrine was branded as unorthodox” (535).
1 




standard reason for the treatment of Bailey’s contribution; for apart from Bailey’s neglect of 
“prospective value relations through time” – on which see below, section VI, …. -- “in every 
other respect his position is unassailable….  It was one of the few real injuries done to the 
progress of Economic Science by the solidarity of the English Classics that, presumably 
because of its attacks on Ricardo and Malthus, Bailey’s work was allowed to drop into 
neglect” (1935: 60n). 
  J.A. Schumpeter refers to Seligman’s “justly famous article … for which all students of 
the history of economics have every reason to feel lasting gratitude” (1954: 464).  As for 
Bailey:  “In 1825, Bailey launched his attack [on Ricardo’s system] that should have been 
decisive on the merits of the case” (1954: 478); and again:  “Bailey attacked the Ricardo-
[James] Mill-McCulloch analysis on a broad front and with complete success.  His 
Dissertation, which said, as far as fundamentals are concerned, practically all that can be 
said, must rank among the masterpieces of criticism in our field, and it should suffice to 
secure to its author a place in or near the front rank in the history of scientific economics” 
(486).
2  More specifically:  “The peak performance was Bailey’s….  He showed up the 
weaknesses of Ricardo’s analytic structure forcefully, in particular, the futility of Ricardo’s 
method of eliminating natural agents from the value problem, the arbitrariness involved in 
calling quantity of labor ‘the sole determining principle of value,’ the defects of the concept 
of real value and of the Ricardian theory of profit, and so on” (599).  And Bailey was the first 
to turn the analogy between payments for the services of superior land and of superior work 
“into an objection to the West-Ricardo theoretical pattern” (679).  
  Cotterill’s comment that there are “some Ricardians still remaining” (1831: 8), led 
Schumpeter to conclude that “the decay of the Ricardian School must have become patent” 
soon after 1826 (478)  But he hedged his account with multifold qualifications.  Thus, the 




contemporaries did justice to him, it became clear in time that he had turned the tide and dealt 
a fatal blow,” with specific mention made of Cotterill’s contribution, which “should not be 
forgotten because of its defense of (most of) Bailey’s tenets” (599; emphasis added).  
Similarly, Bailey’s critique did not “pass unnoticed,” for “several writers, Read among them, 
acknowledged indebtedness to him and followed his lead and it is safe to presume that his 
influence extended beyond the range of explicit recognition” (486-7).  And though a poll of 
writers on value from 1826 to 1845 would produce a considerable majority for Bailey,” 
nevertheless there occurred no “spectacular victory” (487), Bailey’s “defeat” (our emphasis) 
accounted for on several grounds.
3  First, his challenge was “premature” and failed to show 
how Ricardo’s system might be replaced:  “Bailey’s criticism was indeed constructive and 
did suggest by implication how the system he attacked could have been replaced by a more 
satisfactory one; but he did not try to do so, and those who followed in his wake and tried 
were no match for the shadow of Ricardo.  They no doubt undermined his system and thus 
helped toward J. S. Mill’s transformation of it, but they did so by a slow process of attrition 
rather than by spectacular victory.”  Thus Bailey and those who followed his example helped 
“undermine” the system “but they did so by a slow process of attrition.”  And that Bailey’s 
attack was not decisive, Schumpeter opined in line with Seligman, could be partly explained 
by “the henchmen who continued to stand by their guns and to teach exploded doctrine as if 
nothing had happened” (478).  J.S. Mill is portrayed as one of the worst offenders, insofar as 
he “emphasized his early Ricardianism throughout and neither realized himself nor made it 
clear to his readers how far he had actually drifted away from it by the time he wrote his 
Principles.”  The Seligman-Schumpeter position had, of course, been suggested earlier by 
Jevons:  “There were Economists, such as Malthus and Senior, who had a far better 
comprehension of the true doctrines (though not free from the Ricardian errors), but they 





  R.M. Rauner, for his part, starts his specialist study of Bailey on value by observing that 
“the many things that Bailey said so well so much earlier had to be re-discovered all over 
again.  Professor Seligman, in his memorable article, was amongst the first to start the re-
discovery” (1961: 1; also Rauner 1987: 174).  And similarly D.P. O’Brien gives Seligman an 
excellent press (1988: 180-2, 186-8), and takes on board much of his position on Bailey: 
Although Mixter had published earlier on Bailey [Mixter 1898],
4 it was really 
Seligman who drew attention to Bailey’s Dissertation [1903, pp. 352-355].  Noting 
Bailey’s critiques of Ricardo’s verbal muddle, of the concept of absolute value, of the 
use of the cost of production theory of value, of the equation of cost of production 
with labor cost, of the idea of homogeneity of labor input, and of the Ricardian 
inverse relationship of wages and profits without reference to labor productivity, as 
well as Bailey’s introduction of time preference, and his generalization of the rent 
concept, Seligman really set the tone for most of the later discussions (198). 
O’Brien himself emphasizes Bailey’s “excellent understanding of Ricardo (by no means a 
common achievement), his sustained criticism of the invariable measure, and his discussion 
of Ricardo’s inverse relationship of wages and profits,” and points out that “[o]n the more 
positive side he is generally credited (correctly in the opinion of this writer) with 
generalization of the rent concept, and with pointing out that degrees of fertility are not 
necessary for the emergence of rent while, on the other hand, and in practice, 
nonhomogeneity characterized labor as well as land ….  He is also credited with establishing 
(by introspection …) the existence of positive time preference.” 
*     *     * 




“foreshadow[ing] the most recent contributions to economic doctrine,” and wrote of Bailey 
that his contributions “constitute doctrines of importance in the recent phases of the science.” 
These remarks suggest that Bailey’s work was part of an alternative paradigm to Ricardo’s.  
He is, however, much more cautious in summarizing his position regarding Bailey (and 
Cotterill) at the outset of Part II of his paper:  “In the controversy that arose during the early 
twenties on the subject of value we found that important criticisms of the Ricardian theory 
were advanced by Bailey and Cotterill, and that the foundation stones for an entirely different 
theory was laid by Lloyd, the originator of the marginal utility doctrine of value” (1903: 
511).
5  And similarly at the close of his paper, the focus is on the contributions by Lloyd, 
Read and Longfield, “above all the theory of marginal utility as the basis of value, and the 
marginal productivity theories of wages and interest …” (534), with Bailey assigned to the 
second rank of dissenters, making a contribution of a critical rather than positive nature. 
  Marian Bowley, writing a generation after Seligman, objected that if by “classical 
economics” specifically Ricardian doctrine was intended, – as was common in “semi-
popular” discussion – then “neither Senior, Longfield, W.F. Lloyd, nor any of the other 
economists to whom Professor Seligman drew attention, nor the French economists, can be 
included under it” (1937: 16).  She regretted that “economists who criticized Ricardo, as for 
example Senior and Bailey, have been considered simply as critics who perhaps added some 
improvements by the way but who did not differ from him on fundamental doctrine,” her own 
view being that “the developments of the theory of value between 1823 and 1862,” revealed 
“two different and more or less contemporary schools even in England” – the Ricardian and 
the utility schools (16-17).  However, when it comes to evidence regarding Bailey, she 
offered little justification for designating him a “utility” theorist, focusing rather on his 
rejection of any sort of “intrinsic” value, and his emphasis on the exceptions to a cost theory 




position on the broader issue, arguing that in fact “[n]o revolutionary significance” was 
attached by contributors in the British literature to the law of diminishing marginal utility, or 
the concept of intensity of demand, or utility measurement, since these all stemmed from the 
Wealth of Nations” (1972:27).  What, however, was indeed “inherently revolutionary” was 
“[t]he analysis of the limited validity of the pure cost of production theory of natural price by 
Bailey, Senior and Cournot in terms of market structures,” for it “contained elements which 
led straight to the rejection of that convenient and important simplification” (28; emphasis 
added). 
  Mark Blaug too maintained that “Bailey’s criticism of Ricardo contained the germs of a 
far-reaching reconstruction of basic economic concepts” (1958: 58) – though he adds that 
only Senior realized it .
6   Rauner is yet more definite in his estimate of a paradigmatic 
breakthrough on Bailey’s part:  “… like Jevons, Bailey understood that Ricardo’s 
determination to use “absolute” or “real” cost concepts was bound to bring him to untruths.  
On his essentially relativist foundation Bailey appreciated that a valid theory of value 
proceeded from more complex causes than simple labour quantity.  He understood that a 
theory of value depended on 'mental states,” on “estimations,” on “scarcity,” and on “time” 
and so on (1961: 94).  Again:  “Enough had been said of Bailey’s approach to prove that the 
only reduction worth making was to ‘mental states’ not ‘original factors.’  The significance of 
this should not be underestimated, however, for it is only from the ‘mental states’ standpoint 
that a complete theory of alternative costs can emerge – which is to say, it is only from such a 
standpoint that utility can properly be related to cost of production and cost of production, in 
its turn, freed from some association with the negative concept of physical real cost of pain.  
The virtues of Bailey’s position in all of this can hardly be lost” (101).  Similarly, Rauner’s 






  From a larger perspective, by stressing relative value exclusively, Bailey pulled 
economic analysis back from the Smith-Ricardo stream that sought a principal cause 
of value to explain the production and distribution of material wealth among the 
labouring, rentier and capitalist classes.  In Bailey’s argument relative values – prices 
– vary for all kinds of reasons affecting demand (“esteem”) and supply (production 
under constant or increasing cost, supply-limiting) conditions.  Hence, his view 
involves no notion of long-run growth, tendencies toward equilibrium, stationary 
states or other systemic visions.  Everything is relative; individual economic welfare 
is expressed period-by-period solely in terms of relative values (1987: 174). 
Essentially, “Bailey’s work freed analysis from the need to link production and distribution to 
socioeconomic class relationships.  It pointed instead towards relationships between 
individual needs and perceptions, and the material goods that can satisfy them.” 
  D.P. O’Brien opens his discussion of “Classical Reassessments” dealing with the 
contributions by Longfield, James Mill, Senior, Bailey, Torrens and Say by declaring that 
these writers “were men of independent mind and independent spirit.  While they could 
hardly fail to be affected by Ricardo in some way, they looked for solutions to economic 
problems without being unduly trammeled by the question of whether or not they were 
keeping within some kind of Ricardian orthodoxy – indeed one of them (Mill) helped to 
create it” (1988: 179-80).  And at the close: 
It should be clear that any account of classical economics which treats the writers 
considered here as offering only minor variations on Ricardo and/or Smith is highly 
misleading and that many of the classical economists apart from Ricardo and Smith 
were men of outstanding capabilities who solved problems left unsolved by more 




historians of economic thought) that the idea of classical economics as the pale 
reflection of Ricardo is a gross distortion.  In fact, despite the grandiose English and 
the patronizing tone, Schumpeter’s judgment seems frequently to have been 
vindicated, and the process of reappraisal which he helped to initiate has resulted in a 
fundamental change of perspective on classical economics (212). 
  I am not concerned now with O’Brien’s writers apart from Bailey – except to remark that 
placing James Mill in the same cage as the others listed is asking for trouble – but when we 
look more closely at what O’Brien has to say of Bailey specifically we face a problem.  
Bailey’s independence from Ricardo is enthusiastically supported by reference to Rauner’s 
1956 doctoral dissertation according to which “Bailey placed the rationale of economic 
activity in mental phenomena [Rauner 1956: iii] … reject[ing] the physical material 
conceptions of classical economics … his use of introspection as empiricism [being] entirely 
consistent with this [504-6]” (1988: 200).  Bailey, in brief, “saw economics as a science of 
mind [496-526] – it was not concerned with technology.  His basic philosophical position is 
extraordinarily ‘Austrian’ and is much more post-1870 than the recently received 
interpretation would suggest, in this respect at least.”
7  Yet for all that we also find, in the 
same contribution O’Brien playing down Bailey’s originality in economics – with good 
reason as I shall presently show – insofar as he firmly denies that Bailey was “part of a 
separate tradition of economic thought, contemporary with mainstream classical economics, 
[for] it now seems clear that Bailey was in the main classical tradition insofar as his positive 
value theory was concerned and that he did not provide material either for a separate tradition 
or for a revolution in value theory” (199).
8  For one thing “he had no proper demand curve.”  
What has happened to Bailey’s “independent spirit”?  Moreover, while O’Brien pays tribute 




find a position implying that the dissenters, Bailey included, were indeed “unduly 
trammeled” by “some kind of Ricardian orthodoxy”:  “The weight of ‘the Ricardian errors’ 
was so strong that even the critics and outspoken opponents of Ricardo came under their 
spell.  Consequently the original contributions of men like Malthus, Bailey, Scrope, Jones, 
Longfield, and Senior took the form of isolated theoretical innovations, carrying no practical 
import, which were either brushed aside or assimilated without disturbing the mainstream of 
Ricardian economics.  The short-comings of anti-Ricardian economics – its eclectic 
character, its failure to carry through – far more than the dogmatism of Ricardo’s disciples 
was the factor responsible for its lack of success” (Blaug 1958: 227; emphasis added).  But 
Blaug too is difficult to pin down. To “assimilate” and to “brush aside” are vastly different 
reactions, while he also writes of the “votaries” of Ricardo – James Mill, McCulloch, a 
Westminster Reviewer of 1826, De Quincey – as “weather[ing] Bailey’s criticism with 
admirable equanimity” (56), which certainly implies a refusal to do Bailey proper justice, that 
is a dogmatic response.   
*     *     *     
Much of the literature discussed above takes for granted that Bailey’s criticisms of Ricardo 
were technically valid.  Some accounts, including that by Seligman himself, caution against 
going too far in representing Bailey as leader of, or even participant in, a paradigmatic 
transformation of doctrine, a caution downplayed by Schumpeter and Rauner.  In any event, 
the participants in this debate fail to take proper account of the advice offered by Jacob Viner 
that any investigation of the extent and nature of the early dissension requires that attention 
be accorded to the replies of the Ricardians to their critics, for “some of the criticisms against 
the Ricardian analysis were either based on misinterpretations of it or would have been 
accepted by the Ricardians…” (1958: 419-20).  Only thus is it possible to evaluate properly 




say, to do justice to this procedure requires precision and accuracy in the perception of 
“Ricardianism” – we must at all costs avoid the meaningless “some kind of Ricardian 
orthodoxy” encountered above. 
  In Section II, we shall follow Viner’s recommendations with respect to Bailey, having in 
mind a notion of Ricardian classicism giving pride of place to the inverse wage-profit relation 
with its focus on “proportional” wages and its derivation in terms of an invariable money 
measure of value, and its application to the problem of growth subject to land scarcity 
entailing a fall in the commodity wage and also – because of the rise in money or proportional 
wages – a simultaneous fall in the profit rate (see Hollander 1977, 1979, 2001).
9  It emerges 
that in many cases Bailey’s criticisms constitute misunderstandings of Ricardo’s position, 
while others would have been considered wholly acceptable by Ricardo.   
  A second set of issues with which we shall be concerned relates to Bailey’s “influence” 
on other “dissenters” (Cotterill, Read, Senior, Lloyd and Torrens), on the “Ricardians” 
(James Mill, McCulloch and J.S. Mill), and on Malthus.  Here we have in mind Seligman’s 
representation of Bailey as an “acute critic” of Ricardo on value who “exerted considerable 
influence at the time” (1903: 352), and Schumpeter’s assertion that Bailey’s influence “was 
much greater than appears on the surface (1954: 599, cited above, p…).  We have too an 
evaluation by Blaug to the effect that “[t]he impact of Bailey’s attack upon contemporary 
thinking was profound, judging by the number of references to it in an age not given to 
crediting sources” (1958: 55-6).  Now an “impact” might not be of a positive order, but 
Blaug’s reference in this context to a statement by Malthus regarding “the impression which 
[the Critical Dissertation] is understood to have made among considerable political 
economists” (1986 [1827] 8: 60), implies that a positive influence is intended.
10 Our analysis 





II  BAILEY AS RICARDIAN MALGRÉ LUI 
 
  Our analysis in this section in effect dots the i’s and crosses the t’s of the position stated 
all too briefly by Elie Halévy writing shortly after Seligman but to precisely the opposite 
effect: 
In 1825, in A Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measures and Causes of Value 
[1825: xi-xii] an economist philosopher, Samuel Bailey, showed that the quantity of 
labour can be considered neither as the measure nor as the cause of value.  As a matter 
of fact, all the elements of his criticism are borrowed from Ricardo’s book.  He 
established the fact that the quantity of labour is not the cause of value in cases of 
monopoly, and that the value of labour is itself a monopoly value; that it is not the 
cause of value in cases in which a certain commodity can be produced in indefinite 
quantities, but with a constantly increasing cost of production; that value cannot be 
explained by the quantity of labour, because labour is not a homogeneous quantity, 
and can be of various qualities.  Ricardo had already said all this:  Bailey confined 
himself to insisting on the importance of the cases which Ricardo persisted in treating 
as exceptional.  On another point he made an innovation:  he emphasized the analogy 
between the benefit of rent and “the extraordinary remuneration which an artisan of 
more than common dexterity obtains beyond the wages given to workmen of ordinary 
skill”:  the owner of fertile soil and the possessor of unusual skill secure a monopoly 
price, a monopoly which is restricted in the first case by the existence of lands of 
inferior quality, and in the second case by the existence of inferior degrees of 
dexterity [1825: 196-7].  But the origin even of this idea that value contains 





The sense and validity of the term “borrowed” in Halévy’s statement will be taken up in a 
concluding section. 
  We commence by taking note of James Mill’s observation in his “On the Nature, 
Measures, and Causes of Value” for the Westminster Review of 1826
12 that Ricardo would 
not have objected to the principal theme of the first chapter of the Critical Dissertation 
relating to the nature of value:  “This chapter is logomachy, simply and purely.  It makes 
profession, or rather ostentation and parade, of being a controversy with Mr. Ricardo.  But it 
contains not an assertion, who which, as far as ideas politico-economical are concerned, Mr. 
Ricardo would not have assented; it contains, not indeed, as far as such ideas are concerned, 
an assertion which is not implied in the propositions which Mr. Ricardo has put forth.  It is a 
criticism on some of Mr. Ricardo’s forms of expression …” (Mill 1826b: 157).  Schumpeter 
considered Mill’s contribution to be “pathetically inadequate” (1954: 599),
13 and O’Brien 
sees it as a reflection of Mill’s “fury” (1988: 200).  But that Mill represented Ricardo’s 
viewpoint is apparent from the latter’s reaction to the anonymous Verbal Disputes of 1821, 
which in its essentials is so similar to the Critical Dissertation that Bailey feared he might be 
accused of plagiarism (see Appendix B).  Writing to Trower in August 1821 Ricardo 
observed: 
  With respect to our difference of opinion on the subject of exchangeable value it is 
more an apparent difference than a real one.  In speaking of exchangeable value you 
have not any idea of real value in your mind – I invariably have.  Your criticisms on 
passages in my book are, I have little doubt, correct, because they are also the 
criticism of others on the same passages.  A pamphlet has appeared “On Certain 
Verbal Disputes in Polit. Econ.” where the same ground of objection is taken as you 




(1951-73 9: 38). 
As for the justification for the Ricardian reaction – though not perhaps Mill’s tone – that is 
clear enough as I shall now show.
14   
  We set out by focusing on Bailey’s charge that Ricardo’s notion of an invariable standard 
is self-contradictory:  “It would be an absurdity to suppose, that the value of A to B could 
alter, and not the value of B to A; that A could rise in value to B, and B remain stationary in 
value to A …” (1825: 5; also 16, 103).
15  It is clear that this objection follows directly from 
Bailey’s definition of value as exchange value, that his case is purely terminological:
16 
  The specific error of Mr. Ricardo on the subject of invariable value consists … in 
supposing, that if the causes of value affecting one commodity remained the same, the 
value of that commodity could not vary, overlooking the circumstance, that value 
denotes a relation between two objects, which must necessarily alter with an alteration 
in the causes affecting either of them.  He incessantly identifies constancy in the 
quantity of producing labour with constancy of value.  Hence he maintains, that if we 
could find any commodity invariable in the circumstances of its production, it would 
be in the first place invariable in value; and, 2ndly, it would indicate, or would enable 
us to ascertain, the variations in value of other commodities (121). 
In point of fact, a commodity produced with a constant labour input, Bailey observed, “would 
enable us to ascertain, not the fluctuations in value between two or more commodities (for 
these are facts to be gathered from appropriate evidence), but the fluctuations in the quantity 
of labour which produced them” (124).  Alternatively expressed, we would be enabled to 
establish in which commodity “those [observed] fluctuations had originated” (121).  Now this 
renders precisely the purpose of Ricardo’s measure
17–  Ricardo’s famous justification for 




this very clear (1951-73 1: 20-1) – and the critique amounts to no more than an unwillingness 
to use the term “value” in the Ricardian fashion.   
  A further passage is similarly revealing: 
  I have already had occasion to remark, that since value is a relation between two 
objects, it requires no proof that it cannot arise from causes affecting only one of the 
objects, but from two causes, or two sets of causes respectively operating upon the 
objects between which the relation exists.  It A is equal in value to B, this must be 
owing, not only to causes operating on A, but also to causes operating on B.  In 
investigating the sources of value, however, it will be necessary to treat of these 
causes separately; and it may not be useless to recollect, that although value must in 
every instance arise from the combination of two sets of causes, any alteration, any 
rise or fall of value, may proceed from only one.  The value of A and B is the effect of 
causes acting on both, but a change in their mutual value may arise from causes 
acting on either: as the distance of two objects is to be referred to the circumstances 
which have fixed both of them in their particular situation, while an alteration of the 
distance between them might originate in circumstances acting on one alone (183-4; 
emphasis added). 
By admitting so much Bailey once again was rendering wholly irrelevant his charge of an 
“inherent contradiction” in the very notion of an invariable standard.  Equally striking, while 
Sowell (1970: 404) attributes to Bailey rejection of “the idea of an aggregate value of 
national output” as “meaningless,” Bailey in fact recognized that “the truth” of Ricardo’s 
proposition whereby if technical change permits a general doubling of output from a given 
labour force, the higher product would remain of the same value, each individual unit falling 




And yet a further, indeed a determining, indication of Bailey’s undermining of his own 
critique is the following footnote which frankly allows that the Ricardian programme seeking 
the source of variation in observed exchange rates was a “rational, and might prove a useful 
inquiry”: 
  The same remark will apply to economists in general.  Their real object in seeking 
for a measure of value (however little they may be aware of it) is to determine in 
which commodities any changes of value have originated, and not to ascertain the 
extent of these changes, which, as I have repeatedly stated, are matters of record and 
evidence, and a knowledge of which is in reality pre-supposed in any application of 
what they call a measure.  It is not, therefore, a measure of value which they are in 
pursuit of, but a commodity which would indicate the sources of variation.  Whether 
there is any one object which would do this better than another, would at all events be 
a rational, and might prove a useful inquiry (127n; emphasis added). 
Again, Bailey – near the outset of his book – refers to “[t]he truth intended to be conveyed by 
saying that B remains of the same value is, that the cause of the altered relation between A 
and B is in the former, and not in the latter; and to determine where the change originated is 
in fact the whole object of those who endeavour to show what commodities have remained 
stationary in value and what have varied” (12; emphasis added. Also p. 6.)  Why then does he 
immediately revert to the irrelevant charge that invariability of “value” understood as 
exchange value – rather than real value –  is “absurd” (18)?  It is also extremely difficult to 
appreciate Bailey’s charge (in the extracted passage above) that the Ricardians were unaware 
of what they were about.  We need but let Ricardo speak for himself:  “When commodities 
varied in relative value, it would be desirable to have the means of ascertaining which of 




after another with some invariable standard measure of value, which should itself be subject 
to none of the fluctuations to which other commodities are exposed” (1951-73 1: 43). 
  Bailey thus concedes the game, if rather ungraciously:  “Many of the strictures, which 
have been made on Mr. Ricardo’s writings … would be in some degree obviated if two things 
were conceded, namely, if we assumed that he was constantly speaking of real value, and if 
we were to grant him the absurdity which we have shown this expression to imply; or, in 
other words, if we were to consider it as importing cost of production, without relation to the 
power of commanding in exchange” (253; emphasis added).  Bailey must have forgotten here 
that he had himself represented Ricardo’s concern to be precisely the isolation of the source 
of an observed change in exchange rates.
18  Apparently, he feared that he had allowed too 
much:  “But then, although some inconsistencies would by this means be obviated or 
explained away, we should obtain in their place a number of other equally irreconcilable, and 
also a series of unmeaning and identical propositions.  For instance, the proposition that a 
million of men always produced the same value, but not the same riches, would be reduced to 
this, that what a million of men produced always cost the labour of a million men:  a = a.”  
Needless to say, an identity is not an error. 
  That Bailey conceded the validity of the Ricardian exercise, only to proceed as if the 
 
 concession had never been made by concentrating solely on use of the term “value” as 
 
 synonymous with exchange value rather than allowing for the alternative sense of real costs, 
 
 is apparent also when he cites Ricardo’s own belief regarding “the impossibility of finding 
 
 any commodity of invariable value” (19), yet insists on a fundamental difference between 
 
 himself and Ricardo. For Ricardo, Bailey points out, invariability could not be satisfied since 
 
 “no commodity could be found, which is not itself exposed to the same causes of fluctuation 
 
 as all other commodities,” whereas for Bailey himself, even “if all commodities were 
 





 simplest case – “any commodity, which always required the same quantity of labour, could 
 
 not be invariable in value, while every other commodity underwent alteration:  [Ricardo] 
 
 asserts, on the other hand, that such a commodity would be invariable …” (20-1; also 119). 
 
 As he expressed the matter in his Letter to a Political Economist – responding to the 
 
 Westminster Review strictures on the Critical Dissertation – he had never said of Ricardo, 
  
and various others including Lauderdale and Torrens, that “they deny the impossibility of an 
 
 invariable measure;” rather, “they maintain … invariableness to be necessary to constitute a 
 
measure of value, while I contend that invariableness has nothing to do with it” (1826: 14- 
 
15).  Bailey can only be understood if one takes his usage of the term “value” as indicating  
 
exchange, rather than real, value and understand its “measurement” correspondingly.
19 
 
  Bailey thus recognized the “truth” and “usefulness” of Ricardo’s quest for a commodity 
that is “invariable” in its own costs, as a means to recognize the source of a change in 
observed exchange rates.  Strikingly, his own Money and its Vicissitudes of Value (1837) 
follows precisely along these Ricardian lines by distinguishing between, and evaluating the 
effects of, a change in the exchange rate between money and commodities – the “value of 
money” – originating in circumstances affecting money alone, and circumstances affecting 
commodities alone such as general productivity increase not pertinent to the precious metals, 
i.e., “[s]upposing money to be unaffected by any variations originating on its own side, [in 
which case] the prices of other commodities must necessarily fall as the facility of supplying 
such commodities increases” (1837: 17).
20  He only insists – in line with A Critical 
Dissertation and A Letter to a Political Economist – that “[t]his steadiness of value, so 
desirable in money as a medial commodity and a commodity of contract, is quite inessential 
to it in its capacity of the measure of value” (9).  A rose by any other name …! 




Not only is it the case, as several commentators have remarked, that Bailey himself presented 
no alternative model, but of this he was well aware – “the science cannot yet be exhibited as a 
regular and perfect structure” (1825: xii) – although he did express a methodological 
preference for greater “generality” than characterized the Ricardians.  For all that, he frankly 
admitted in the concluding chapter “On the Causes of Value” that Ricardo himself was not a 
guilty party, while even his objection to the “followers” is somewhat watered down: 
  Mr. Ricardo, indeed, explicitly allows the influence of other causes [than labour 
embodiment], such as time, differences in the proportion of fixed and circulating 
capital, and inequalities in the durability of capital, by which he admits the value of 
commodities is liable to be affected.  Notwithstanding these modifications, however, 
his followers continue to lay down the position of quantity of labour being the sole 
cause of value in the most precise and positive terms; not that they deny the 
exceptions, but they appear to lose sight of their existence, and frequently fall into 
language incompatible with their admission; while they altogether overlook the source 
of value to be found in partial or incomplete monopolies, and the intermixture in 
production of commodities which are indebted for their value to different causes (230-
1).
21 
These allowances regarding Ricardo come as a surprise since Bailey had earlier noted that 
“[t]he only place in Mr. Ricardo’s work, where I have been able to find the expression of the 
general rule properly qualified is the Index.  He there says, ‘the quantity of labour requisite to 
obtain commodities, the principal source of their exchangeable value” (213-14n).
22  In any 
event, he also recognized elsewhere Ricardo’s position that a wage variation will influence 
relative prices in the event of differing factor proportions (217); similarly with respect to “the 




Ricardo, but Mr. Mill contends, that time can do nothing.”  The book closes in surprisingly 
mild terms; and in the passage in question Bailey candidly admits that his purpose had not 
been to decide whether or not Ricardo had “really enriched” political economy, a matter he 
leaves open – confirming that he himself was well aware that he had not developed an 
alternative model: 
If Mr. Ricardo, as his admirers allege, has really enriched the science of political 
economy with any new and important truths (a point which this is not the place to 
decide), we may safely pronounce that they are not inferences from the doctrine, that 
the quantity of labour employed in the production of commodities is the sole 
determining principle of their value.  It may be affirmed, without any hazard of error, 
that there is not one of them, whatever they may be, which would not equally flow 
from the more accurate proposition, that it is the principal cause (232). 
  A word regarding Bailey’s complaint in the penultimate extract that Ricardo’s followers 
– if not Ricardo himself – had neglected the implications for pricing of “partial” or 
“incomplete” monopolies, the early nineteenth-century term for less than infinitely-elastic 
supply, covering the standard increasing-cost case characterizing agriculture.  Thus though 
Ricardo formally classified commodities according to the “source” of their exchangeable 
value, namely “scarcity” and quantity of labour, focusing on the latter because quantitatively 
the most significant (citing Ricardo 1951-73 1: ….),  
[i]nstead of confining himself to these commodities, he enters into the consideration 
of the value of labour, of corn, of gold, and of other articles, in the production of 
which competition certainly does not operate without restraint; but which he is 
obliged to bring under that head, from the imperfect classification with which he sets 




the quantity of labour necessary to produce them:  but of none of them can this be 
asserted; for the value of labour can in no sense be said to be determined by the 
quantity of labour necessary to produce it:  the value of corn in general is determined, 
on his own principles, by the quantity of labour required to raise corn on the worst 
soils in cultivation, and not by the quantity of its own producing labour; and in the 
same way the value of gold itself depends, not on the labour necessary to produce 
very individual portion of it, but on the labour necessary to extract it from the least 
fertile mines that are worked (228-9). 
Here we have Bailey giving a lesson on the relevance of marginal labour cost, but turning it 
against Ricardo to argue that the price of an average corn unit is not determined by “the 
quantity of its own producing labour,” as if Ricardo had not spent all his time elaborating 
precisely this in his formulations.  Bailey’s summary in this context is further evidence of his 
regrettable preoccupation with classification rather than substance: 
  Mr. Ricardo did not, evidently, allow sufficient importance to that source of value 
which he calls scarcity; not did he consistently bear in mind, that it was the very same 
principle which enabled the owner of land, or of mines, of more than common 
fertility, to raise the value of their articles beyond what would afford the customary 
profit.  Instead of scarcity, or, in other words, monopoly, or protection from 
competition, being an unimportant source of value, and the commodities which owe 
their value to it forming a very small part of the mass of commodities daily exchanged 
in the market, we have seen that it is a most extensive source of value, and that the 
value of many of the most important articles of interchange must be referred to this as 
its origin (229). 




than classification and language.  First, we confirm Bailey’s own adherence to the priority of 
supply conditions from his discussion of the emergence of rent, particularly his position that 
rent is not a “cause” of value.  Consider the following passage which expounds the standard 
Ricardian position regarding pricing in the case of increasing costs: 
  The value of that corn which is produced on lands paying rent, is not, it is 
acknowledged, in proportion either to the capital or to the labour actually expended in 
its production.  It must be owing, therefore, to some other cause; and the only other 
cause is the state of the supply and demand, or the competition of the purchasers.  
This competition might raise to price to an indefinite height, if it were not for the 
existence of other lands, which although they could produce corn only at a greater 
cost, would be brought into cultivation as soon as the price had risen sufficiently high 
to pay the ordinary profits on the capital required.  It is, therefore, the possibility of 
producing corn, or the actual production of it, at a greater cost, which forms the limit 
to its value.  But although this is the limit beyond which its value cannot rise, it cannot 
be said to be the cause of its value.  It is the cause of its being no higher, not the cause 
of its being high (194-5). 
Bailey here even commends Ricardo’s form of expression, which is quite unusual:  “We 
accordingly find that the expression used by Mr. Ricardo on this subject is, not that the value 
of corn is caused, but that it is regulated by the cost of production on the least fertile lands.  
The owners of land of superior fertility enjoy a monopoly, which, however, does not enable 
them to raise their commodity indefinitely, according to the varying wants and caprices of 
mankind, but which is bounded by the existence of inferior soils.” (195)  He goes on to point 
out that perceiving rent as a “monopoly” return or an “extraordinary profit which is obtained 




competition,” it followed that such “extraordinary profit might exist, although the land in 
cultivation were all of the same quality; nay, must exist before inferior land was cultivated; 
for it could be only in consequence of extraordinary gains obtained by the monopolizers of 
the best land, that capital and labour would be expended on soils of a subordinate order.  
Rent, therefore, might exist, while all the land under cultivation was of equal fertility” (196). 
  We come now to our second point, that – pace O’Brien (above, p. …) or Rauner (1961: 
109) or Sowell (1970: 405) – not one word of this is in any way novel, Ricardo having shown 
in detail that differential rent is but a special case of a more general phenomenon – scarcity 
value.  Thus in his discussion of early settlements, he observed:  “no one would pay for the 
use of land, when there was an abundant quantity not yet appropriated, and therefore, at the 
disposal of whosoever might choose to cultivate it” (1951-73 1: 69).  Conversely, “[if] air, 
water, the elasticity of steam; and the pressure of the atmosphere, were of various qualities; if 
they could be appropriated, and each quality existed only in moderate abundance, they, as 
well as the land, would afford a rent, as the successive qualities were brought into use” (75).  
The extension of this statement runs explicitly in terms of demand-and-supply (and refers to 
the authority of J.B. Say):  “On the common principles of supply and demand, no rent could 
be paid for such land, for the reasons stated why nothing is given for the use of air and water, 
or for any other of the gifts of nature which exist in boundless quantity . . . ; as the supply is 
boundless, they bear no price.  If all land had the same properties, if it were unlimited in 
quantity and uniform in quality, no charge could be made for its use, unless where it 
possessed peculiar advantages of situation” (69-70).  Indeed, Ricardo takes Smith to task for 
focusing on the physical contribution of the land factor and neglecting the dependency of 
rental value on scarcity:  “Dr. Smith does not reflect that rent is the effect of high price . . . .  
It is . . . from the price at which the produce is sold, that rent is derived; and this price is got 




consumption to the supply” (77n).  There is too Ricardo’s position that rent may be generated 
even in the absence of differentials, for it is diminishing returns at the intensive margin which 
constitutes a more general case (71, 72).  And finally, there is recognition of rent as a pure 
demand-determined surplus, generated even on marginal units of output, in the (unlikely) 
case of zero-elastic supply, referred to by Ricardo as a case of “monopoly” price (250-1).
23  
Bailey had added nothing. 
  We return to Bailey on pricing, and a concession – confirming all that we have said 
above – that “[t]here is at the bottom, little actual difference among economists as to [the] 
causes [of value], but they do not agree either in their methods of explanation, or in the 
language they employ” (199).  At this point, however, Bailey adds a proposition that has 
struck some readers – including Seligman (see above, p…) – as particularly significant:  “It 
has been shown [1-2, 180, 183] that the immediate causes of value are the considerations 
which act on the minds of human beings, and that the circumstances, which form or furnish 
those considerations, must be the causes into which the economist has to inquire.  Our present 
object, therefore, is to find those circumstances which act upon the mind with certainty and 
precision, in the interchange of commodities of the class under our notice” (emphasis added).  
We are thus cautioned by Bailey himself to keep the “philosophical” background so 
enthusiastically championed by O’Brien (above, …), in proper perspective.
24  As Rauner put 
the matter:  “It will be recalled [1961: 5-6] that Bailey had asserted that value, in the ultimate 
sense, appeared to be the esteem in which an object was held.  Since it was impossible to give 
this ultimate esteem any accurate, quantitative expression, Bailey had put in its place the 
concept of relative esteem and its manifestation in relative or exchange value” (1961: 120).  
The point to be emphasized is that Bailey goes on to focus on costs of production as the main 
consideration in the case of commodities “which can be increased by industry, and on which 




suffice to discover, that the principal of these circumstances must be the cost of production.  
No man, who bestows his time and attention on the production of a commodity, will continue 
to produce it for the purpose of exchanging it against another commodity, which he knows 
costs less to the producer than his own:  and, on the other hand, every producer will be 
willing to sell as large a quantity of his commodity as he can dispose of at the same price as 
his fellow producers’ (199-200).  This sort of proposition is wholly orthodox, though it must 
immediately be noted that Bailey adheres to the Torrens position (Torrens 1821: vi-vii; also 
1818: 336) when he writes that “[i]n a civilized country … the mass of commodities are 
determined in value by the capital expended upon them” (1825: 206).
25  Even terminology 
suggestive of “states of mind” appears in Ricardo’s discussion of the tendency to cost price:  
“It is then the desire, which every capitalist has, of directing his funds from a less to a more 
profitable employment, that prevents the market price of commodities from continuing for 
any length of time either much above, or much below their natural price” (1951-73 1: 91).   
  Similarly orthodox is Bailey’s further contention that “if we do not aim at undue 
generalization, but are content with a simple statement of facts, the value of objects, in the 
production of which competition operates without restraint, may be correctly stated to arise 
principally from the cost of production; and that cost of production may be either labour or 
capital, or both” (1825: 205; emphasis added).  We need but recall Ricardo’s clarification in 
his third edition that even to maintain a labour theory of value is not to deny the presence of 
costs other than labour costs: 
It is necessary for me also to remark, that I have not said, because one commodity has 
so much labour bestowed upon it as will cost 1000l. and another so much as will cost  
2000l. that therefore one would be of the value of 1000l. and the other of the value of 




those proportions they will be exchanged.  It is of no importance to the truth of this 
doctrine, whether one of these commodities sells for 1,100l. and the other for 2,2000l., 
or one for 1,500l. and the other for 3000l.; into that question I do not at present 
enquire; I affirm only, that their relative values will be governed by the relative 
quantities of labour bestowed on their production (1951-73 1: 46-7). 
And finally, Bailey’s references to non-monetary characteristics, such as “[t]he discredit, the 
danger, the disagreeableness of any method of employing capital,” (in addition to time of 
investment) to illustrate influences on value acting via “the minds of men” (206-7) obviously 
rehearses a celebrated Smithian theme which was standard canonical fare.  
  There is, of course, the question of the empirical significance of cases “on which 
competition acts without constraint.”  But if to this category is added increasing-cost cases, 
including agriculture, the range is greatly extended, so that the main claim – by Senior as well 
as Bailey – that Ricardo had distorted reality by reliance on the constant-cost cases is much 
diluted.
26 
*     *     * 
The terminological penchant of Bailey’s book is also evident from comments upon Ricardo’s 
identification of a change in the “value” of wages – wages in terms of the invariable measure 
– with a change in the proportion of wages in aggregate output, that is the representation of 
labour as rising or falling in value “only when a larger or smaller proportion of the 
commodity produced goes to the labourer” (1825: 56).  For Bailey restricted the term “value” 
to refer to exchange-value, the “value of labour” indicating therefore commodity wages (46); 
on the other hand, he perceives profits as a rate of return on the “capital employed” such 
capital entailing wage payments, i.e., his notion of profits runs in proportionate terms:  “a rise 




increase of proportion, the other an increase in the quantity which a definite portion of labour 
will command” (64); again:  “it is an increase in the portion of the product assigned to the 
labourer which constitutes a rise in the value of his labour; but it is an increase in the 
proportion assigned to the capitalist which constitutes a rise in his profits” (70).  Not 
surprisingly, on this usage only in the case of constant output must an increase in the 
commodity wages paid to a given work force involve a decline in the profit share (Bailey’s 
rate of profit); whereas allowing for increase in output (and neglecting rent) wages and profits 
may both vary in the same direction (70, 57).  As Bailey pointed out in a Note his contention 
was simply “that in cases of improved productive power, the product might be so divided, 
that the rate of profits [identified with the profit share in output] should be increased while 
the value of labour [the commodity wage] was enhanced” (241). 
  Nothing in all this conflicts in any way with Ricardian analysis.  To the contrary, a 
feature of Ricardo’s growth model is the increase of the commodity wage with no reduction, 
even conceivably an increase, in the profit rate, in early stages before manifestations of land 
scarcity, i.e. when production is subject to increasing returns: 
In different stages of society, the accumulation of capital, or of the means of 
employing labour, is more or less rapid, and must in all cases depend on the 
productive powers of labour.  The productive powers of labour are generally greatest 
when there is an abundance of fertile land: at such periods accumulation is often so 
rapid, that labourers cannot be supplied with the same rapidity as capital. 
  It has been calculated, that under favourable circumstances population may be 
doubled in twenty-five years; but under the same favourable circumstances, the whole 
capital of a country might possibly be doubled in a shorter period.  In that case, wages 




would increase still faster than the supply (1951-73 1: 98).
27 
And, by the same token, in the course of subsequent expansion subject to declining marginal 
productivity, both the wage and profit rates tend downward simultaneously (101; see 
Hollander 1987:194-202, 2001, 2007). 
  Bailey’s criticisms of the inverse profit-wage relation were evidently not directed at 
Ricardo’s position as Ricardo understood it, namely as a theorem entailing the “real” wage or 
cost of producing the wage measured in terms of his hypothetical “gold” which also indicated 
the proportional wage.  And in fact Bailey conceded that “Mr. Ricardo’s inference is a 
legitimate deduction from his premises, if we concede certain postulates.  Grant him the kind 
of value called real, which has no relation to the quantity of commodities commanded, but 
solely to the quantity of producing labour, and it inevitably follows, that there could be no 
alteration in the real value of labour, but from an alteration in the proportion of the product 
which went to the labourer” (1825: 58).  So far, so good.  Unfortunately, he errs when he 
adds:  “Neither, if money were always produced by a uniform quantity of labour, could there 
be any alteration in the money-value of labour (58n).  For Ricardo’s money wage is, of 
course, not a constant; Bailey seems to have confused Ricardo’s with Malthus’s measure! 
  Also to be noted is the fact that Bailey’s recognition that the profit rate falls when 
commodity wages rise (given labour productivity) runs along strictly Ricardian lines, 
involving as it does the proposition –that pace Adam Smith – capitalists cannot pass on the 
higher wage costs to consumers in the form of higher prices, since the prices, that is the 
exchange values, of all commodities cannot logically be raised simultaneously: 
  The proposition, that when labour rises profits must fall, is true only when its rise 
is not owing to an increase in its productive power.  If labour rises while these 




proved from the principles already advanced; for if labour rises in value, whoever 
purchases labour must give a greater quantity of other things for it, and as the 
capitalist purchases labour, he must pay more for it.  It will be said, perhaps, that he 
may raise the value of his goods, that is, he may require a greater quantity of other 
commodities than before, in exchange for his own.  But the capitalist who produces 
these other commodities is in the same predicament, and they cannot both raise their 
goods…. [I]t is a contradiction to maintain, that a universal rise in the value of labour 
can increase the value of commodities (64-5).
28 
  There is not a word here that had not been spelled out conspicuously by Ricardo, though 
Bailey chose not to mention this fact: 
  No alteration in the wages of labour could produce any alteration in the relative 
value of these commodities: for suppose them to rise, no greater quantity of labour 
would be required in any of these occupations, but it would be paid for at a higher 
price, and the same reasons which should make the hunter and fisherman endeavour to 
raise the value of their game and fish, would cause the owner of the mine to raise the 
value of his gold.  This inducement acting with the same force on all these three 
occupations, and the relative situation of those engaged in them being the same before 
and after the rise of wages, the relative value of game, fish, and gold, would continue 
unaltered.  Wages might rise twenty per cent., and profits consequently fall in a 
greater or less proportion, without occasioning the least alteration in the relative value 




III  REGARDING BAILEY’S INFLUENCE ON OTHER “DISSENTERS”:  COTTERILL, 
READ, SENIOR, LLOYD, TORRENS 
  To arrive at an overall evaluation of a writer’s influence is notoriously difficult and some 
efforts merely amount to loose subjective generalizations, such as Schumpeter’s “a poll of 
writers on value from 1826 to 1845 would produce a considerable majority for Bailey” 
(above, p. …), or Blaug’s representation of the attitude of Torrens toward Bailey as “typical, 
perhaps of the average reaction” (below, p….)..  We shall take the easier route and limit 
ourselves to questioning the assertions by Seligman and other commentators regarding  a 
“major” influence by Bailey on specific authors. 
  Seligman represented Bailey as an “acute critic” of Ricardo on value who “exerted 
considerable influence at the time” (above, p. …).  But when we seek the justification for this 
assertion we find only a focus on an alleged impact on C.F. Cotterill: 
… the views of Bailey were in part repeated and developed by Cotterill in his 
Examination of the Doctrines of Value [1831].  Cotterill makes short work of the 
labour theory of value, which he deems to have been completely refuted by Bailey, 
the author of the Critical Dissertation, of whose name he seems to be ignorant.  He, 
nevertheless, proceeds to repeat the arguments, “as there are some Ricardians still 
remaining” (1831: 8).  De Quincey’s dialogues he considers “an ingenious logical 
legerdemain” (38).  Like Bailey, he opposes to the labour theory the cost of 
production theory of value.  He proceeds, however, to criticize Bailey on one point, 
and in this criticism, he marks a retrogression.  Bailey thought that the cause of 
changes of value “may be correctly stated to arise principally from the cost of 
production and that the cost of production may be either labour or capital, or both” 




not include profit (1831: 41) (Seligman 1903: 355).   
There is also Cotterill’s broadening of the rent concept to labour, but on this matter “Senior 
as well as Cotterill was preceded … by Bailey” (356).  It will be noted that Seligman is 
unclear whether in his estimation Senior owed a positive debt to Bailey.  He also makes 
mention of Samuel Read who “confesses that in his main point of theory he has been 
anticipated by Bailey,” referring to the proposition that wealth is not the result of 
accumulated labour, but of labour and capital (517; also 353), which again does not 
necessarily imply influence.  
  In my view the Seligman-Schumpeter reading of Cotterill is wanting.  In the first place, 
Cotterill’s comment that there are “some Ricardians still remaining” (above, pp. …, …) 
cannot bear the weight both place upon it, for Cotterill also refers to variations of exchange 
value proportionate to variations in relative labour input as a proposition which “most 
economists maintain” – in contrast to Smith’s position relating increases in prices “to the rise 
in wages” (1831: 107).  Beyond this, and yet more damaging, is Cotterill’s own recognition 
of the need for an “invariable standard,” and his belief in the possibility of its construction; 
indeed, amongst the most important features of his pamphlet Cotterill himself counted the 
statement of “the conditions necessary to a standard of value” and the refutation of “the 
erroneous doctrine that the supposition of such a standard involves contradictory conditions” 
(v).  And it was Bailey (as well as Torrens) whom he largely had in mind by this latter 
statement (99).  His main objection as far as concerned Ricardo himself was to the specific 
character of Ricardian “money” as an invariable standard – in his estimate it was impossible 
to talk meaningfully of exchange value in terms of such a medium – but not to the principle 
of the matter.  In fact, Cotterill himself provided illustrations of the “correct” procedure 




alteration in distribution (76).  And he candidly recognized Ricardo’s contribution to the 
proposed solution:  “The conditions, however, essential to an invariable standard, do appear 
to me so very obvious, especially upon Mr. Ricardo’s own principles in opposition to Adam 
Smith.”
29 
  Cotterill, moreover, was dissatisfied with significant parts of Bailey’s performance 
regarding the “causes” of value:  “the causes of value, as stated by the author of the ‘Critical 
Dissertations &c’ are extremely unsatisfactory: notwithstanding many parts of that work 
cannot but be admired by everyone friendly to the science of political economy” (1831: 53);
30 
nor did he think that Bailey’s work constituted “a performance likely to set the controversy at 
rest; on the contrary, I consider the Author’s use of the term value, on many occasions, 
inconsistent with its obvious meaning, and the chapter on the causes of value, in my opinion 
leads to nothing less than complete scepticism.  So that, however, certain I am, that the work 
has done much to evolve the difficulties in which the subject was acknowledged to be 
enveloped, and however dexterously I conceive the author detected the double meaning in 
which Ricardo used the term [exchange value and real value] I cannot but regret the 
appearance of these blemishes” (40-1).  Thus if Cotterill was critical of Ricardo in the context 
of the causes of value, he was equally dissatisfied with the treatment by Bailey, whose 
explanation of long-run exchange value in terms of cost of production was “defective”:  “it 
does not include profit, and therefore never can determine value, because, though the labour 
or capital should not vary, the profit may vary, and consequently the value of any 
commodities.”  (On similar grounds Cotterill objected also to Torrens (46).)  He was also 
critical of Bailey’s position on the measure of value, as we have seen. 
*     *     * 
Seligman’s linkage of Read’s book to Bailey’s contribution (above, p. …) and more strongly 




Read followed in his Ricardo criticism . . . “ (1954: 488) are open to question.  Read’s central 
position is that “[l]abour itself cannot vary, because it consists of a fixed and invariable 
quantity of bodily toil, pain, or suffering, which the labourer must undergo, and which times, 
nor places, nor the power of men cannot alter.  Wages may indeed vary, and we can 
understand the proposition when it is said that wages rise or fall; but when it is said that 
labour rises or falls, is there any meaning in the expression? – Is it really intelligible? – What 
is it that rises when labour rises? – Wages. – But this is not labour itself; it is the reward or 
recompense of labour” (1829: 105).
31  And he
 explicitly took Bailey to task for neglecting to 
consider the value of commodities in terms of “their relation to mankind and to human 
labour”: 
  Notwithstanding the very high respect I entertain for this author, it will be seen in 
the following pages, that I find occasion to differ from him very widely in his main 
positions in the “Critical Dissertation.”  It appears to me that the fundamental error in 
that work, and that from which all the others to be found in it flow, consists in his 
treating of value as if it were a mere relation of commodities between themselves; 
whereas it appears to me that the idea of value in commodities cannot even be 
conceived without being mingled with the idea of their relation to mankind and to 
human labour, of which some portion must always be employed in producing or 
procuring them originally (viii).
32 
Professor Meek in his study of the “decline of Ricardian economics in England” refers to this 
same passage relating value to “mankind and human labour,” but mistakenly understands it as 
a position rejected by Read who attributed it to Ricardo, rather than one maintained by Read 
himself, and observes that “it was this vital concept which virtually vanished from English 




itself at least as far as concerns Read.
33 
*     *     * 
I return to Seligman’s comment regarding generalization of the rent doctrine, that “Senior as 
well as Cotterill was preceded … by Bailey” (above, p. …) which does not necessarily imply 
influence.  Bowley too is somewhat reticent:  “It is tempting to consider Bailey as … of some 
importance [in the development of Senior’s economics] although Senior never referred to the 
Dissertation in connection with the theory of value …” (1937: 94); again, regarding “the 
bearing of the existence of different wage rates on the labour theory of value,” she writes, 
“played some part in Bailey’s criticism of Ricardo [and] may have indirectly influenced 
[Senior]” (193); and regarding the “extension of the rent concept” by Senior  in Political 
Economy (1836: 129-30), that “Bailey had already extended it to wages in 1825” (131; also 
70n).
34  
  Mark Blaug does, however, insist on a positive and strong obligation of Senior to Bailey: 
  Nassau Senior seems to have been the only writer to have realized that Bailey’s 
criticism contained the germs of a far-reaching reconstruction of basic economic 
concepts.  In an appendix to Whately’s Elements of Logic (1826) [see Senior 
1951(1836): 227-39] he adopted Bailey’s generalization of the concept of rent as only 
a “species of an extensive genus,” while avoiding Bailey’s abuse of the term 
“monopoly.”  Furthermore, Senior pointed out, what is spoken of as “profits” includes 
the “wages of the labour of the Capitalist,” whereas much of what is included under 
“wages,” such as the income of professionals, ought to be classed under “profits” in 
that the acquisition of professional skills is analogous to the investment of capital 
(1958: 58).   




how much he had learned from Bailey.”
35 
  Blaug is here referring to Senior’s “Report on the State of Agriculture,” for the Quarterly 
Review of 1821.
36  But if we take the trouble to read this article we find ample material 
suggesting that it is Bailey who in 1825 might have been initially inspired by Senior in certain 
key respects.  Particularly noteworthy is Senior’s representation of rent as a monopoly return 
and its exclusion from price; his insistence that it is not the cultivation of inferior land that is 
the “cause” of a high corn price, but the high price itself, due to high demand, that is the 
“cause” of the cultivation of inferior land and the emergence of rent;
37 and his observation 
that “when we say that the price of a thing is governed by the cost of production [referring to 
intra-marginal corn units] we mean the cost of its own production, not of the production of 
something else [marginal corn units], “all of which are to be found in Bailey 1825. (See 
Appendix C. 
*     *     * 
I shall allow myself brief comments on Lloyd and Torrens both highly praised by Seligman.  
As for Lloyd, Seligman we recall, did not assert an explicit influence upon him by Bailey, 
though he seems to suggest that Bailey by clearing away the undergrowth by his criticism of 
Ricardo allowed Lloyd to proceed more readily to a marginal utility exposition.  Now 
Seligman presumed Lloyd to be a full-fledged dissenter from Ricardo, and it is true that his 
definition of “value” focuses on utility.  But the purpose of his pamphlet was to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of saying of a commodity that it varies in value “without any reference to other 
objects” (1834: 28).  He rejected the assertion (as expressed anonymously by J. S. Mill in the 
Westminster Review in 1825) that “value is a relative term:  if it is not this, it is nothing:  if 
any one talks about absolute value, or any other kind of value than exchangeable value, we 
know not what he means” (34).
38  He similarly took Say to task for his proposition that “the 




of comparative estimation with some other specified object” (citing Say 1880 [1819]: 284); 
and he objected to that proposition as elaborated in Verbal Disputes (1821: 10-11), which, as 
we have noted earlier, resembles Bailey’s Critical Dissertation.  All this greatly complicates 
the usual story, as we found to be the case regarding the view of Cotterill and Read as obliged 
to Bailey. 
  Other complexities arise in the case of Torrens, whose description of the Critical 
Dissertation as a “masterly specimen of perspicuous and accurate logic,” is said to be 
“typical, perhaps, of the average reaction” to Bailey (Blaug 1958: 57 citing Torrens 1826: 
xii).  More specifically, he is reported in Mallet’s celebrated account of the Political 
Economy Club’s meeting on 13 January 1831 as opining regarding the status of Ricardian 
value theory that “the dissertation on the Measure of value published in 1825 by Mr. Baillie 
of Leeds, has settled that question” (1921: 223).   
  Two points are in order regarding Torrens’s reaction as an adequate index of Bailey’s 
influence.  First, Torrens intended by the general abandonment of Ricardian value theory, the 
replacement of the pure labour theory by a cost of production theory, which we know to have 
been Ricardo’s own position all along (above, p….).  (On this matter, see Bowley 1937: 90-
1.)  Second, Torrens entered a very strong defence of Ricardo’s proportions-measuring 
“gold” in his later writings, basing himself on Longfield’s position that all non-labour inputs 
may be reduced to labour so that the only payments to consider ultimately are wages and 
profits” (Longfield 1834: 172f).  Accordingly, Ricardo’s linkage of the profit rate to the 
proportionate shares held good; moreover, Longfield also justified Ricardo’s isolation of the 
conditions required to assure that changes in money wages reflect changes in proportionate 
wages (266-7).  As Robbins shows (1958: 55), it is this defence of Ricardo that Torrens 
accepted both in Colonization of Southern Australia 1835,
39  and later in The Budget 1844.
40 




IV  BAILEY AND THE “RICARDIANS”:  JAMES MILL AND McCULLOCH 
  Though Seligman himself was not concerned with the “Ricardians,” later commentators 
have considered the influence that Bailey might have exerted on them.  We shall take up in 
this section the cases of James Mill and McCulloch. 
  J.S. Mill refers in his Autobiography to changes introduced by James Mill into the third 
(1826) edition of the Elements with respect to profit theory based (in some unstated way) on 
the “Conversations” held at Grote’s house (1963-91 [1873] 1: 125).
41  Since the Critical 
Dissertation was one of the books examined by the study circle, the question of Bailey’s 
possible influence on James Mill naturally arises.
42 
  We shall take as base point the second (1824) edition of the Elements.  When considering 
the contention by some “that profits of stock depend not solely upon the share received of 
that which is divided, but also upon the magnitude of the whole that is to be divided,” Mill 
distinguishes between “profits” as a quantity of commodities and its more “common” 
meaning as a rate of return on capital (including food, raw materials and tools) – a ratio of 
values – asserting that only in the latter case do “profits depend wholly upon wages,” since 
technical progress (or diminishing returns) raising (or lowering) output yielded by given 
capital and labour will not affect aggregate value of that output, so that “if the value of that 
which is divided as wages of labour and profits of stock remains the same, it is obvious and 
certain, that the proportion of that value which goes as profits of stock depends wholly upon 
that which goes as wages.  The rate of profits, therefore, or the ratio which the value of that 
which is received by the capitalist bears to the value of the capital depends wholly upon 
wages” (1824: 73-6). 
  It is thus Mill who, before Bailey, pointed to the more usual sense of profits as a rate of 




despite changing productivity; only with the uncommon usage of profit as an absolute 
quantity of commodities did the inverse relation require qualification. 
  Much of this is reworked in the third (1826) edition of the Elements and it has been 
suggested, inter alia by Rauner, that as far as concerns the theory of profits the “influence of 
Bailey is discernable (Rauner 1961: 114), though Rauner concludes “[i]t would perhaps be 
wrong to claim that Mill’s struggles with the profits problem grew exclusively out of Bailey’s 
criticisms” (117).  In our view this is a fair summing up.  Doubtless the revisions were made 
in the light of the Critical Dissertation, and it is only to be regretted that Mill nowhere 
mentions Bailey (see Winch 1966: 191).  But we find no substantive retractions in the new 
version; rather, Mill sought to strengthen the Ricardian case. 
  The 1826 alteration sets out by clarifying that “[i]n speaking of the produce which is 
shared between the capitalist and labourer … I always mean such net produce as remains 
after replacing the capital which has been consumed….  [W]e must set apart the portion, 
always a determinate amount, which is for the capital consumed, and which is distinct from 
profits and from wages” (1826a: 71-2).  Mill then proceeds to distinguish between an 
alteration of profits or wages in proportionate terms, where “the proposition that profits 
depends upon wages, admits of no qualification” – evidently, since this follows by definition 
– and in absolute terms as a change in the quantity of commodities” (72).  Regarding the 
latter case:   
  If a change in the quantity of commodities is meant, it will not be true, in that 
sense, that profits so depend upon wages, as to fall when wages rise, and rise when 
wages fall:  for both may fall, and both may rise together.  And this is a proposition 
that no political economist has called in question.  If the powers of production are 




divide.  The proportions remaining the same, both wages and profits will, in the one 
case, be raised, in the other depressed.
43 
This in fact adds little to the 1824 conclusion, but it nicely confirms our position in Section II 
(above, pp. …). 
  Of greater potential interest, at first sight at least, is the specification of a change in 
wages and profits in terms of value.  If value-in-exchange is intended the original conclusion 
regarding the quantity or absolute dimension remains:  “When we say that the labourer 
receives a great quantity of commodities, and when we say that he receives a greater 
exchangeable value, we denote by the two expressions, one and the same thing.  In this sense, 
therefore, nobody has ever maintained that profits necessarily rise when wages fall, and fall 
when wages rise:  because it was always easy to see, that, by an alteration in productive 
power, both may rise or fall together, and also that one may rise or fall, and the other remain 
stationary” (1826: 74).  But when the sense of Ricardian or “real” value is adopted, 
whatever the output to be shared, its value – if produced “by an invariable quantity of labour” 
– remains constant, so that should wages rise in “value” the remainder or profits falls, and 
“[i]n this sense of the word value … it is strictly and undeniable true, that profits depend 
upon wages so as to rise when wages fall, and fall when wages rise” (75).  However, this too 
merely restates, if in sharper terms, what had been affirmed in 1824 that aggregate value 
remains unchanged (above, p…).  
  Now at this point Mill reverts – as in 1824 – to “the common mode of expressing profits 
“as a rate of return on capital “including the wages, which it is necessary to advance,” for in 
practice profits are expressed not “per cent of the produce but per cent upon his capital.”  Yet 
in the end this too is played down:   




commodity, which sells for 120l.; we have first to deduct 50l. for the capital 
consumed; there then remains 70l. to be divided between the capitalist and the 
labourers; and if we suppose that 50l. has been paid for wages, in other words, that 
such is the share of the labourers, the capitalist receives 10 per cent upon his capital; 
including here, in the term capital, what he has advanced as wages; but he receives 
28½ per cent of the produce, or of that which is divided after replacing the capital 
consumed.  It is only, however, the language which here is different; the thing 
expressed is precisely the same; and whether the capitalist says he receives 10 per cent 
upon his capital, or 28½ per cent of the produce, he means in both cases the same 
amount, viz. 20l. (75-6). 
  The rate-of-return perspective as the usual mode of expressing profits so much insisted 
upon by Bailey – and for which James Mill himself had precedence – is thus identified with 
the proportionate shares (of net produce) perspective.  And the inverse wage-profit relation as 
holding good unreservedly in this case is reaffirmed as in 1824.  Bailey had exerted no effort 
whatsoever. 
  Torrens’s part in this episode bears mention.  In the preface to the third edition of his 
Essay on the External Corn Trade he controverted Mill’s 1826 defence of Ricardo’s inverse 
relationship, maintaining that proportional wages might remain unchanged while the profit 
rate increased when account is taken of non-labour inputs (Torrens 1826: xvi-xviii), that pace 
Mill the inverse relation “was equally untenable, whether the terms alterations of wages, 
alterations of profits are employed with a reference to proportions, or whether they are used 
in relation to quantities” (xv-xvi), in effect putting his weight behind Bailey.
44  (See also 
below, pp. … regarding Torrens’s commendation of McCulloch for accepting Bailey’s 




basing himself on Longfield’s defence of Ricardo. 
  There remains to note the conditions required of a measure of value, namely that it be a 
product produced by a constant quantity “of labour and capital” – identified with 
“immediate” and “hoarded” labour (Mill 1824: 108-110), and that it be produced “under the 
medium circumstances” and this “because by far the greater number of commodities are 
produced under circumstances more nearly approaching to the medium than any of the 
extremes” (111).
45  Mill points to real-world gold as most closely approximating the latter 
condition, that is as “less imperfect as a measure of value than any other commodity, perhaps 
which could be taken” (112).  A mean-proportions measure is required to minimize the 
variations in relative prices upon a change in the wage rate (109).  Such effects, Mill does 
allow, despite his notoriously extreme formulations of a labour theory (94, 97) for which he 
was taken to task by Bailey (1825: 207, 217-19).
46  Furthermore, though the price structure is 
disturbed by a change in the wage in terms of medium-proportions money, aggregate value 
remain unchanged: 
If money be supposed to correspond with case No. 2, or to be produced, which is 
probably not far from the fact, by equal proportions of labour and capital, then all 
commodities produced under these medium circumstances are not altered in price by a 
rise of wages:  those commodities which approach nearer the first extreme, or admit a 
greater proportion of labour than capital in their formation, rise in price:  those which 
approach the second, that is, have a greater proportion of capital than labour, fall: and, 
upon the aggregate of commodities, or all taken together, there is neither fall nor rise 
(107-8).
47  
  These Ricardian formulations remain unchanged in 1826: 105-17.  Bailey’s objections 




and conclusively remarked … that time does nothing.  How then can it create value?  Time is 
a mere abstract term.  It is a word, a sound” (1824: 99) – is deleted, presumably in reaction to 
Bailey’s animadversions, but a more elaborate justification is offered for conceiving capital 
as “hoarded labour” (cf. 1824: 97-9 and 1826: 101-4).  There is no “retreat” on substantive 
matters. 
*     *     * 
O’Brien, in his specialist study of McCulloch, makes the point that Bailey’s “famous 
onslaught [on Ricardo] might have been expected to have a significant impact on 
McCulloch,” but it failed to do so partly because “his main fire was directed against the 
invariable measure; McCulloch was with him there” (O’Brien 1970: 137), which I take to 
mean that McCulloch had no need for Bailey on this issue.
48  Again:  “The invariable 
measure was central to Ricardo’s system [but] never interested McCulloch at all….  [T]hough 
McCulloch paid a great deal of lip-service to Ricardo, he never accepted his position: hence 
his acknowledgement of Bailey’s comments on the invariable measure” (146).   
  An indication of McCulloch’s position on the standard value is provided by two letters to 
Ricardo of 1823 which might – except for the accompanying labour-theory element – easily 
have been written by Bailey himself so close are they on the matter of principle: 
It is evident I think that there neither is nor can be any real and invariable standard of 
value; and if so it must be very idle to seek for that which can never be found.  The 
real inquiry is to ascertain what are the circumstances which determine the 
exchangeable value of commodities at any given period – and these I think are all 
clearly reducible to one – the comparative quantities of labour bestowed on their 
production (11 August 1823; in Ricardo 1951-73 9: 344). 




liable, apply to my theory – If I were seeking a standard to measure values at distant 
periods they would apply and would be decisive; but this is no part of my object – I 
am only endeavouring to ascertain the circumstances which determine the 
comparative values of the commodities in the same market – The question agitated 
between you and Malthus is totally different – it is, what are the circumstances 
necessary to give invariability of value to any commodity? – This is a question which 
I believe is quite insoluble, but at any rate it does not come within the scope of my 
inquiries – I leave it to be settled by my masters – Before entering on this 
transcendental part of Pol Economy I must be more sure than I am at present of the 
elements; and before I attempt to get a measure of the value of cloth and wine in the 
reign of Augustus and George IV, I must obtain a measure of their value in the same 
market – (24 August; 369).
49 
  Bailey thus had little to teach McCulloch, and O’Brien is correct to point this out.  But he 
loses sight of the fact that in his Principles McCulloch proceeds along purely Ricardian lines.  
He seems to have taken to heart Ricardo’s position (very much in the manner of   James 
Mill), as I shall now show. 
  McCulloch cites Bailey favorably at one point in his Principles:  “The conditions 
essential to the production of an invariable measure of exchangeable value were first clearly 
pointed out in the Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value, p. 17 
(McCulloch 1825: 214n; emphasis added).
50  This can only refer to Bailey’s case that a 
measure of exchangeable value makes no sense – that “how constant or uniform soever a 
cause affecting one commodity may be; it cannot make that object of constant value, without 
the concurrence of other invariable causes acting upon the commodity with which it is 




convincing since his quest had been rather to isolate the “source” of an observed change in 
exchange values, fully aware of the complexities involved (above, p. …).
51  And this quest is 
reflected in McCulloch’s Principles.  Certainly he writes that an invariable measure – of real 
value or costs – is in practice unattainable since all commodities are subject to “perpetual 
variations” in labour input reflecting diminishing returns and/or technical progress (221), but 
the requirements in principle – which are all Ricardo sought to define – are spelled out.  
Thus, as a conspicuous instance, McCulloch distinguished conceptually between a nominal 
wage change and a “real” wage change the latter reflected by a change in terms of money of 
“invariable value,” or money produced with constant labour input, which also implies a 
change in proportional wages (295);
52 and it is the latter that concerned him with an eye to 
profit-rate determination (365, 380; see below p…n,…).  A second condition is that money 
be produced by a process entailing mean factor proportions (310).  Yet more important, 
McCulloch demonstrated that a rise in the wage leaves unchanged aggregate value though 
the price structure will be affected, implicitly applying a mean-proportions measure: 
  It must also be observed, that though fluctuations in the rate of wages occasion 
some variation in the exchangeable value of particular commodities, they neither add 
to nor take from the total value of the entire mass of commodities.  If they increase the 
value of those produced by the least durable capitals, they equally diminish the value 
of those produced by the more durable capitals.  Their aggregate value continues, 
therefore, always the same.  And though it may not be strictly true, of a particular 
commodity, that its exchangeable value is directly as its real value, or as the quantity 
of labour required to produce it and bring it to market, it is most true to affirm this of 
the mass of commodities taken together (312-13). 




as measure “a medium” between the extreme factor ratios as “best adapted to the general 
mass of commodities” (Ricardo 1951-73 8: 193).  This rationale is briefly alluded to in his 
third edition (1951-73 1: 45-6).  Again in later correspondence of 21 August 1823, Ricardo 
wrote:  “as the great mass of commodities is produced by the union of labour and capital for a 
certain length of time, I have nothing to amend in the choice I have made; I consider it a 
mean” (1951-73 9: 361).  Now McCulloch adopted this line in his own Principles, where 
disturbances to the price structure generated by a wage change are played down on the 
empirical grounds that they are “confined within comparatively narrow limits…. [because] in 
point of fact, a very large class of commodities are produced by means of nearly equal 
portions of fixed and circulating capital….” (311).  Here McCulloch was following Ricardo, 
but he may also have benefited from James Mill’s formulations, since various examples 
devised to indicate the impact on the price structure of a change in the way are said to be 
“substantially the same” as those in Mill 1824: 103 (McCulloch 1825: 309n).  Subsequently, 
McCulloch went even further by referring to the alleged feature that real-world money, 
“which is all but universally taken as a standard by which to estimate price, is usually 
produced by capitals of about the medium degree of durability” so that “the influence of 
variations of wages on prices, will, on the whole, be confined within very narrow limits, the 
rise in those mainly produced by hand labour being balanced by the fall in those principally 
produced by machinery” (1864: 292). 
  Most significant is the fact that McCulloch reinforces the Ricardian structure by 
providing an allocative rationale – later adopted by Marx – for the price restructuring created 
by a wage increase, turning on the correction, by way of resource transfers, of profit-rate 
inequalities: 




temporary duration.  For the undertakers of those businesses, in which either the 
whole or the greater portion of the capital is laid out in paying the wages of labour, 
observing that their neighbours, who have laid out the greater portion of their capital 
on machinery, are less affected by the rise of wages, will immediately begin to 
withdraw from their own businesses, and to engage in those that are more lucrative.  
The class of commodities produced by the most durable capitals, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, &c. 
will, therefore, become redundant, as compared with those produced by the least 
durable capitals, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.; and this increase on the one hand, and 
diminution on the other, will have the effect to sink the value of the commodities 
produced by the most durable capitals as compared with those produced by the least 
durable capitals; or, which is the same thing, to raise the value of the latter compared 
with the former, till they all yield the same rate of profit. 
  The class of commodities produced by capital of the medium degree of durability, 
or by No. 6, would not be affected by the rise; for, whatever they lost in exchangeable 
value, as compared with the commodities produced by the less durable capitals, they 
would gain as compared with those produced by the more durable capitals (303-4). 
All of this, is properly represented by McCulloch as a confirmation of Ricardo’s position 
(298-9, 313), though McCulloch errs by implying that a wage change generates no change in 
general prices only when the output to be shared is constant (306). 
  McCulloch’s adoption and indeed reinforcement of the Ricardian perspective is scarcely 
in the nature of “lip service,” as O’Brien would have it.
53  And only thus can we properly 
appreciate his stance twenty years later when he repeated verbatim his 1825 position that 
“[t]he conditions essential to an invariable measure of exchangeable value were first clearly 




acute, Mr. Bailey does not appear to have properly appreciated the Ricardian theory of value, 
or to have succeeded in any degree in shaking its foundations.”  Bailey evidently had no 
effect on McCulloch – as he had none on James Mill – not because McCulloch sided with 
Bailey on the invariable measure but, to the contrary, because he rejected Bailey’s “famous 
onslaught.”   
  There are other objections to the Critical Dissertation.  One entails a strong defence of 
De Quincey against Bailey: 
  The acute and ingenious author of the Templars’ Dialogues, (London Magazine, 
May 1824, p. 551,) has stated, that “It is very possible for A continually to increase in 
value – in real value observe – and yet command a continually decreasing quantity of 
B” [1970 (1834): 80].  This passage has been animadverted upon by the author of the 
Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value [1825: 41].  
Nothing, however, can be more perfectly correct than the statement in the Dialogues – 
A and B have been produced by certain quantities of labour; but more labour is now 
required to produce A, and a still greater proportional quantity to produce B; under 
these circumstances, A must obviously have increased in real value, or in the 
estimation of its producers, for it has cost them a greater sacrifice of toil and trouble; 
but as A has not increased so fast in real value as B, it is plain it will now exchange 
for, or purchase a less quantity of B.  It is difficult to conceive how the author of the 
Dissertation should not have perceived this distinction; but if he had perceived it, he 
would certainly have spared not a few of the remarks he has made on the statements 
advanced by Mr. Ricardo, as well as by the author of the Dialogues.  Dissertation on 
the Nature, &c. p. 41 (220n). 




  I may here observe, that the author of the Critical Dissertation on Value [Bailey 
1825: 194], contends, that because the value of that corn which is raised on lands 
paying rent, is not, after inferior lands are taken into cultivation, proportioned to the 
cost of its production, it is incorrect to represent the value of the aggregate quantity of 
produce raised in a country where cultivation has been extended over inferior lands, as 
depending on that principle.  But those who maintain, that the value of raw products, 
and of all those commodities whose quantity can be indefinitely increased, by the 
application of fresh capital and labour to their production, is regulated and determined 
by the cost of their production, invariable refer to the quantity of labour required to 
produce that portion of raw produce, or of any required commodity which is raised 
under the most unfavourable circumstances (285). 
  There remains to discuss a further aspect of the Bailey-McCulloch relationship perceived 
in the literature, entailing a transition by McCulloch from the pure Ricardianism, with respect 
to profit rate determination, of his 1823 contribution to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, to a 
qualified version appearing in his Principles 1825 under the influence of Bailey’s Critical 
Dissertation (see Rauner 1961: 113-14).  For “McCulloch himself had not freed profits from 
dependence on ‘proportional wages’ until after the Critical Dissertation had appeared” (113).  
We shall consider this assertion. 
  Consider first McCulloch’s exposition in 1823 of the inverse wage-profit relation in the 
context of secular growth, indicating the joint incidence of diminishing returns:  “profits” – 
the context specifies concern with the profit rate though leaves the denominator of the 
expression undefined – “do not depend on wages estimated in money, in corn, or any other 
commodity, but on PROPORTIONAL wages, that is, on the share of the commodities 




In the 1825 version by contrast the matter is more complex:  “there are very many exceptions 
to Mr. Ricardo’s theory”: 
  Mr. Ricardo has endeavoured to show, in one of the most original and ingenious 
chapters of his work, that the RATE of profit depends entire on the proportion in 
which the produce of industry, under deduction of rent, is divided between capitalists 
and labourers; that a rise of profits can never be brought about, except by a fall of 
proportional wages, nor a fall of profits, except by a corresponding rise of 
proportional wages.  It is evident, however, that this theory is universally true, only in 
the event of our attaching a different sense to the term profits, from what is usually 
attached to it; and supposing it to mean the real value of the entire portion of the 
produce of industry, falling, in the first instance, to the share of the capitalist, without 
reference to the proportion which the magnitude of this produce bears to the 
magnitude of the capital employed in its production.  Thus understood, Mr Ricardo’s 
theory holds universally; and, on this hypothesis, it would follow, that, so long as the 
proportion, in which the produce of industry, under deduction of rent, is divided 
between capitalists and labourers, continues the same, no conceivable increase or 
diminution in the powers of production, could occasion any variation in the rate of 
profit.  But, if we consider profits, in the light in which they are invariably considered 
in the real business of life, – as the portion of the produce of industry, accruing to the 
capitalists in a given period of time, after all the produce expended by them in 
production during the same period is fully replaced, it will immediately be seen, that 
there are very many exceptions to Mr Ricardo’s theory (1825: 367-8). 
Now “capital” in this context includes non-wage items and not only wages – all outgoings 




results, namely that “the proposition that a rise of profits can never be brought about 
otherwise than by a fall of wages, nor a fall of profits otherwise than by a rise of wages, is 
true only in those cases in which the productiveness of industry remains constant.  So long as 
this is the case, or, which is the same thing, so long as the same capital is employed, and the 
same quantity of produce has to be divided between capitalists and labourers, it is impossible 
the share of the one can be increased without that of the other being diminished” (373).  
Moreover, “if profits depended on the proportion in which the produce of industry is divided 
between capitalists and labourers, they could not be affected by variations in its 
productiveness, but would be determined wholly by the state of proportional wages.  But 
profits depend on the proportion which they bear to the capital by which they are produced, 
and not on the proportion which they bear to wages” (373-4).  In an example entailing a 
doubled return given labour and non-wage capital, McCulloch shows that “both parties will 
still obtain the same proportions of the [net] produce of industry as before; and if we look 
only to them, we must say that neither profits nor wages have risen.  But, when we compare, 
as is invariable done in estimating profits, the return obtained by the capitalist with the capital 
he employs, it will be found, notwithstanding proportional wages have remained constant, 
that the rate of profit has increased from 20 to 54 percent” (374).
54   
  Rauner makes his case for a positive influence exerted by Bailey by comparing 
McCulloch’s insistence on perceiving profits as a ratio of net produce to “the capital 
employed in its production” with Bailey’s definition of profits as the “gain of the capitalist 
[relative to] the capital employed” (1825: 63), and also his insistence that the inverse 
relationship held good only with productivity constant (63-4, 70).  He also points to Torrens’s 
fulsome praise for Bailey whose Critical Dissertation he described as “a masterly specimen 
of perspicuous and accurate logic” – exerting an “already perceptible influence” (Torrens 




his recent work upon Political Economy, Mr. M’Culloch has, with laudable candour, 
corrected, in an essential degree, his former opinions on the subject of profit; and has 
admitted, that Mr. Ricardo’s principles are tenable, only when we pervert from their 
established acceptation the terms in which these principles are expressed.  This is the same 
thing as admitting, that the Ricardo doctrine is erroneous.  Arbitrary alterations in the 
meaning of terms are not discoveries in science” (xiii).  Torrens evidently had in mind the 
passages by McCulloch 1825: 367f. cited above (see also Robbins 1958: 53).   
  It will be recalled that James Mill insisted on the inverse profit-wage relation even when 
profits in the sense of a rate of return on capital is employed (above, p…).  McCulloch was 
prepared to qualify the principle in that case.  Yet the details of his argument are not quite 
those of Bailey.  In the first place, Bailey’s rate of return relates to absolute profits relative to 
wage capital alone (Marx’s rate of exploitation, s/v), whereas he perceived the wage as a 
commodity wage (above, p. …); by contrast, McCulloch – very much like James Mill – took 
the profit rate as net profit relative to capital including non-wage items (Marx’s s/(c+v) and 
retained the notion of proportional wages.  Thus McCulloch’s criticism of the inverse relation 
is in fact rather more substantive than Bailey’s since although Ricardo formally defines his 
capital stock of £3000 in his illustrations in the chapters “On Wages” and “On Profits” 
relating to profit-rate determination as including non-wage items as well as wages (1951-73 
1: 117), this seems to be an afterthought adding nothing to the basic analysis. 
  For all that, it is instructive to trace out McCulloch’s treatment of the course of the real 
wage and profit rates during the course of secular expansion given technology in order to 
confirm further the extent of his continued adherence to Ricardianism in the Principles.  To 
be noted first is his firm rejection of Smithian “increasing competition of capitals” as cause of 
the falling profit-rate trend (375) in favour of Ricardian land scarcity, and its effect on 




cause of a fall of profits.  The quantity of produce forming the return of capital and labour 
would never diminish, but for the diminution that uniformly takes place in the productiveness 
of the soil:  nor is there any other physical cause in existence why the proportion of wages to 
profits should be increased, and the rate of profit diminished, as it uniformly is, in the 
progress of society” (380-1).  So we revert after all to the profit rate as a function of the 
proportionate shares – as in 1823 – despite all the mea culpas to the effect that the Ricardian 
theory breaks down except when output is constant.  Indeed, McCulloch goes yet further in 
confirming his Ricardian bonâ fides by insisting – again as in 1823 – on a necessary increase 
in the proportionate wage even in the complex case of a declining commodity wage in the 
course of secular growth assuming land scarcity, a trend represented as one “uniformly 
found”: 
… proportional wages may … be increased at the same time that wages, if estimated 
in silver, corn, or any other commodity, are reduced; and such, in point of fact, is 
almost uniformly found to be the case, when tillage is extended over inferior soils.  
Wherever the best lands only are cultivated, the proportion or share of the produce of 
industry falling to the labourer, is, generally speaking, small; but as labour is, under 
such circumstances, comparatively productive, a small share of its total produce, gives 
a large absolute quantity of necessaries and conveniences:  while, in the advanced 
stages of society, and when cultivation is widely extended over lands of very inferior 
fertility, proportional wages are almost invariably high; but, owing to the increased 
difficulty that then obtains of producing supplies of food, these high proportional 
wages rarely afford a large supply of necessaries and conveniences (362-3; emphasis 
added).
55 




Dissertation did not make much headway with the Ricardians” – that though McCulloch 
“flirted with some of Bailey’s notions … when it came to the point, he was unable to carry 
out the full implications of his dalliance” (1961: 118).  My only qualification is that Bailey 




IV  BAILEY AND THE RICARDIANS:  J.S. MILL 
  Seligman made no mention of J.S. Mill in his paper.  But much of Schumpeter’s case for 
the early demise of Ricardianism (above, p. …) turned on the alleged influence of Bailey’s 
Critical Dissertation, and he certainly implies that J.S. Mill represented the pattern.  For, so 
runs his argument, Mill rejected the conception of a measure of absolute value; only relative 
price mattered, and since value was a ratio all values could not vary simultaneously (1954: 
589).  Similarly, there was no such thing as “the total value of all the services of wealth (or of 
all wealth) taken as a whole” in contrast to the position adopted by Ricardo and Marx.  
Indeed, “the energy with which Mill insisted on the relative character of [exchange value] 
completely annihilated Ricardo’s Real Value and reduced other Ricardianisms to insipid 
innocuousness” (603).  Blaug in the same manner has asserted that “Mill does not derive the 
theorem about profits and wages, as Ricardo has done, from the concept of an invariable 
measure of value.  Even the standard Ricardian thesis that ‘general wages, whether high or 
low, do not affect values’ is entirely divorced from the notion that value is to be measured by 
an invariant standard….  There is no mention in Mill’s discussion … of the important role 
assigned to the invariable measure of value in Ricardo’s system” (1958: 172-3).
56  Similarly, 
O’Brien:  “Mill’s inverse relationship of wages and profits is not derived from the invariable 
measure … as it was for Ricardo (1975: 94; 2004: …  ).  And particularly relevant for us is 
his attribution to Bailey of a potent impact on Mill:  “It is … clear that [Bailey] influenced 
J.S. Mill in a number of areas, including the treatment of rent, the abstinence theory of profit, 
the inverse relationship of wages and profits, the hierarchy of wages as affecting 
exchangeable value, and the rejection of the invariable measure – this despite Mill’s failure to 
credit Bailey” (1988: 198-9), O’Brien citing for support Blaug 1958: 167, 173; 1985: 220; 




influences:  the influence claimed on his behalf on Cotterill and Read [Seligman 1903: 355] 
seems to be unimportant [Rauner 1961: 127-9], and neither counts as a major writer” (199). 
  Let us first of all look closely at the foregoing contentions regarding the inverse 
relationship and its derivation by Mill, and Bailey’s impact on Mill.  We shall keep before us 
a conspicuous statement on the relativity of value appearing in Mill’s early article on the 
Quarterly Review on Political Economy:  “Value is a relative term:  if it is not this, it is 
nothing:  if any one talks about absolute value, or any other kind of value than exchangeable 
value, we know not what he means.  One commodity may rise or fall in value with respect to 
another; all commodities cannot rise or fall in value, with respect to themselves” (1963-91 
[1825] 4: 36).  Now this appeared in the January issue of the Westminster Review and could 
not possibly have been drawn from Bailey’s Critical Dissertation.  Moreover, the article 
constituted a defence of McCulloch against Malthus, and Mill by his assertion was denying 
Malthus’s conception of aggregate demand not challenging the Ricardian position regarding 
absolute value. Unfortunately Lloyd – and so many since – took the statement out of context 
and applied it to the latter (1834: 34).  As for Bailey himself, in A Letter to a Political 
Economist he applauded the sentiment of the article but expressed surprise at finding an 
insistence upon value as a relative conception in the Westminster Review which in 1826 had 
published an attack – which we know to be by James Mill – upon his own Critical 
Dissertation (Bailey 1826: 37).  If the respective contexts are borne in mind the apparent 
inconsistency of position between the journal volumes creates no difficulty whatsoever. 
  What then was J.S. Mill’s position regarding the value issue?  In his Principles, in the 
chapter “Of a Measure of Value” (Book III, Chapter xv), he rejected – as in January 1825 – 
the notion of a measure of exchange value as a conceptual impossibility but insisted upon that 
of a measure of cost of production.  The conditions for the measure are stated as follows:  




labour; to which supposition it is necessary to add, that the fixed capital employed in the 
production must bear always the same proportion to the wages of the immediate labour, and 
must be always of the same durability:  in short, the same capital must be advanced for the 
same length of time, so that the element of value which consists of profits as well as that 
which consists of wages, may be unchangeable” (1963-91[1848] 3: 579).  Now such a 
measure of cost “though perfectly conceivable, can no more exist in fact, than a measure of 
exchangeable value,” because of the likelihood of changes in the production cost of any 
commodity chosen.  Nevertheless, gold and silver “are the last variable” and, if used, the 
results obtained must simply be “corrected by the best appearance we can make for the 
intermediate changes in the cost of production itself.”  This is by no means an out-of-hand 
rejection of the measure of absolute value, and in fact represents precisely the position 
adopted by Ricardo who had laid down the requirements for an ideal measure fully aware of 
its impractibility. 
  Mill also provides a full analysis of the effects of wage-rate changes in his chapter 
“Distribution, as Affected by Exchange” (Book III, xxvi).  When the distribution of national 
income occurs via the mechanism of exchange and money, Mill argued, the “law of wages” 
remains unchanged in so far as the determination of the commodity wages is concerned, for 
this simply depended upon “the ratio of population and capita” (595).  However, the 
implications for the employer were more complex since from his point of view it was not 
commodity wages that were relevant, but the “cost of labour.”  Under certain circumstances, 
the cost of labour would be reflected accurately by the money wages paid – namely when 
money represented “an invariable standard”:  “Wages in the second sense, we may be 
permitted to call, for the present, money wages; assuming, as it is allowable to do, that money 
remains for the time an invariable standard, no alteration taking place in the conditions under 




variation in cost, the money price of labour is an exact measure of the Cost of Labour, and 
may be made use of as a convenient symbol to express it” (696).  Assuming money to be 
such an invariable measure, the rate of money wages will depend upon both the commodity 
wage and the prices of wage goods and accordingly productivity in the wage-goods sector.  It 
is upon the “cost of labour” that the rate of profit depended, the cost of labour identified with 
“money” wages.   
  In the context of a money economy Mill thus defined an inverse relation between the 
profit rate and the money wage rate.  He did not bother formally to equate the “cost of 
labour” – in contrast to his practice in Book II of the Principles – with the proportionate share 
of the labourer in per capital output, but referred back in the present context to the earlier 
analysis (698).  Mill in brief adopted the “proportions-measuring” money in terms of which a 
rise of wages implies an increased share of the labourer in the “value” of his output and a 
reduced profit share, and accordingly rate of return on capital.  The secondary literature, 
which insists on Bailey’s profound influence on J.S. Mill in converting him away from 
Ricardo on the inverse wage-profit relation and its derivation in terms of an invariable 
measure, is evidently entirely misconceived. 
*     *     * 
At this point we turn to a suggestion by Rauner that Bailey’s influence on Mill was of another 
sort, his criticisms of Ricardo inducing Mill to enter a stronger defence in his essay “On 
Profits and Interest,” published in 1844 but written in 1829-30, entailing – according to 
Rauner – a reinforcement of the proportionality property by emphasizing the wage rate as 
referring to the value of the wage not the commodity or absolute wage (Rauner 1961: 113-17, 
135-7). 
  It must be said that there is some a priori justification for linking Bailey’s name to Mill’s 




at Grote’s house in the late 1820s where Mill mentions Bailey and proceeds to discuss 
various “modifications” to the Ricardian theory in the essay on profits: 
We repeatedly kept up the discussion of some one point for several weeks, thinking 
intently on it during the intervals of our meetings, and contriving solutions of the new 
difficulties which had risen up in the last morning’s discussion.  When we had 
finished in this way my father’s Elements, we went in the same manner through 
Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy, and Bailey’s Dissertation on Value.  These 
close and vigorous discussions … brought out new views of some topics of abstract 
Political Economy.  The theory of International Values which I afterwards published, 
emanated from these conversation, as did also the modified form of Ricardo’s theory 
of Profits, laid down in my Essay on Profits and Interest….  I may mention that 
among the alterations which my father made in revising his Elements for the third 
edition, several were grounded on criticisms elicited by these Conversations; and in 
particular, he modified his opinions (though not to the extent of our new speculations) 
on both the points to which I have adverted (1963-91 [1873] 1: 123-5). 
  The objection to Ricardo appearing in the essay on profits related to his reducing capital 
entirely to labour, on the grounds that the repayment of profits entered into the outlay of a 
capitalist upon produced means of production, and not merely wages:  “It is not correct … to 
state that all which the capitalist retains after replacing wages forms his profit.  It is true the 
whole return to capital is either wages or profits; but profits do not compose merely the 
surplus after replacing the outlay; they also enter into the outlay itself.  Capital is expended 
partly in paying or reimbursing wages, and partly in paying the profits of other capitalists, 
whose concurrence was necessary in order to bring together the means of production” (1963-




after replacing outlay to an outlay amounting solely to the wages of direct and indirect labour.  
Consequently:  “Mr. Ricardo’s theory is defective:  … the profit rate does not exclusively 
depend upon the value of wages, in his sense, namely the quantity of labour of which the 
wages of labour are the produce; that it does not exclusively depend upon proportional 
wages, that is, upon the proportion which the labourers collectively receive of the whole 
produce, or the ratio which the wages of an individual labourer bears to the produce of his 
individual labour” (297).  For all that, “[i]t is remarkable how very slight a modification will 
suffice to render Mr. Ricardo’s doctrine completely true.”  This was to relate the rate of profit 
to the “cost of wages” – which includes the profit of the capital-goods producer – as distinct 
form the “value of wages” – which refers to the labour embodied in the wages bill.  But the 
identity between the cost of wages (the strategic wage variable) and the proportionate share 
of labour in output was no longer tenable:  “Mr. Ricardo’s principle, that profits cannot rise 
unless wages fall, is strictly true, if by low wages we mean not merely wages which are the 
produce of a smaller quantity of labour, but wages which are produced at less cost, reckoning 
labour and previous profits together.  But the interpretation which some economists have put 
upon Mr. Ricardo’s doctrine, when they explain it to mean that profits depend upon the 
proportion which the labourers collectively receive of the aggregate produce, will not hold at 
all” (299). 
  It is only the proximity in Mill’s autobiographical account of the modifications to 
Ricardo’s profit theory to his mention of the serious attention paid Bailey at the Grote 
Conversations that awakens the possibility of a Bailey influence, and provides some a priori 
support for Rauner’s view pointing to Mill as seeking to reinforce Ricardo after reading 
Bailey’s criticisms.  But a linkage of this order is in fact unlikely.  Rauner’s argument is 
unconvincing, for it reads Mill’s essay as championing the proportionality thesis in answer to 




himself, we have seen, had accepted the proportionality thesis on Ricardo’s use of terms; 
above, p. ….)  Mill’s “slight modification,” namely the replacement of the “value of wages” 
by the “cost of wages,” seems to be quite independent of Bailey’s commentary.  Rather, in 
this episode can be discerned the possible influence of Robert Torrens, who had insisted that 
the profit rate depends not only on the proportionate share of wages which governed the ratio 
of profits to wages, but also on the non-wage capital required, a technological improvement 
permitting the relinquishing of fixed capital or materials – Marx’s “constant” capital – 
implying a rise in the profit rate (1829: xv-xviii).
57  Even McCulloch is a candidate 
considering the inclusive character of his “capital” (above, p. …). 
  Mill’s qualification to the Ricardo doctrine was, however, adopted only temporarily.  In 
the Principles, as we have seen, he once again championed the proportionality theorem.  His 
argument is simply that since “our supposed capitalist is not meant to represent a single 
employment, but to be a type of the productive industry of the whole country,” the advances 
may after all be reduced in the last resort entirely to wages:  “[I]n the whole process of 
production, beginning with the materials and tools, and ending with the finished product, all 
the advances have consisted of nothing but wages; except that certain of the capitalists 
concerned have, for the sake of general convenience, had their share of profit paid them 
before the operation was completed.  Whatever, of the ultimate product, is not profit, is 
repayment of wages” (1963-91 2: 412). 
*     *     * 
So much for the central inverse wage-profit relation.  O’Brien (above …) also repeats an 
assertion by Blaug that “[f]rom Bailey and from Senior Mill derived the abstinence theory of 
profit, the generalization of the rent concept …” (1958: 167); and in Blaug’s textbook we 
have the similar assertion that Mill’s “statement of the abstinence theory of profit and the 




(1985: 220; 1997: 212).
58  
  As for the abstinence perspective, we certainly recall the brief formulation by Bailey 
noted by Seligman (Appendix A, p. ….).  But influence is another matter.  No evidence is 
provided to show that Mill “derived” or “borrowed” the abstinence theory from Bailey; in 
any event, Bailey is better seen as an “anticipator” of the theory (Bowley 1937: 144n).  By 
contrast, an indisputable “influence” was exerted by Rae’s New Principles (1834).  “In no 
other book known to me” – Mill wrote in his chapter “Of the Law of the Increase of Capital” 
– “is so much light thrown, both from principle and history, on the causes which determine 
the accumulation of capital” (1963-91 2: 162); and to Rae himself:  “I have made more use of 
your treatise than you appear to have been informed of, having quoted largely from it, 
especially from your discussion of the circumstances which influence the ‘effective desire of 
accumulation,’ a point you appear to me to have treated better than it has ever been treated 
before” (19 Sept. 1855; in Mill 1963-91 14: 240).
59   
  We turn to Mill’s alleged “derivation” or “borrowing” from Bailey of the generalization 
of Ricardo’s rent concept.  The Mill analysis relates presumably to his account of “cases of 
extra profit analogous to rent” in industry as well as agriculture such as the extra return to a 
patent holder allowing production at low cost in the event that demand is high enough to 
require the continued contribution of high-cost firms (1963-91 2: 494-5).  And “[t]he extra 
gains which any producer or dealer obtains though superior talents for business, or superior 
business arrangements, are very much of a similar kind” (495; see also 490).  Oddly enough, 
in his discussion of relative wages (380-99) Mill (like Adam Smith) says nothing of natural 
differences of “talent” or “genius” which might give rise to rent – the particular 
generalization specified by Bailey (above, p. …).  There is every reason to believe that this 
sort of extension was acceptable to Mill, but its absence suggests little reliance on Bailey. 




generalization of the rent doctrine had already been set in motion by Ricardo himself (see 
above, p. …).  I would add here reference to Ricardo’s analysis of a contemporary case where 
certain industrial firms had their labour costs subsidized, thus generating a (discrete) 
increasing-cost supply schedule  The appropriate margin and corresponding marginal labour 
cost are explicitly assumed to be governed by “the quantity of produce required,” i.e. by the 
level of demand.  Should that level be sufficiently low for the output of the subsidized firms 
alone to be “equal to all the wants of the community,” the unsubsidized, or high-cost firms 
would be excluded and the equilibrium determined by the low-cost firms; but at higher 
demand the higher marginal cost becomes pertinent (1951-73 1: 73).  This analysis is found 
in the chapter on Rent and the unstated implication of the second case for rent is self-evident; 
it is an exact parallel to Mill’s analysis of the case of a patentee mentioned above. 
  Rauner sees an apparent influence of Bailey on Mill with respect to the implications for 
price of qualitative differences in labour (1961: 139).  I see no evidence for this linkage 
though it cannot be ruled out.  I would point out that recognition of heterogeneous labour led 
both Adam Smith and Ricardo to abandon the pure labour theory, even prior to allowance for 
capital and land, and have recourse to a labour-cost theory.  That Smith continued to speak of 
“labour” immediately after allowing for heterogeneity can be explained by the fact that he 
proceeds to introduce capital and land and for the exposition of the general theory of cost 
pricing did not require to enter into the complexity of the wage-rate structure; he could 
assume for his purposes that when wages change they change for all labour proportionately.  
This is true also of Ricardo whose predominant concern was with the impact of across-the-
board alterations in the wage.  For all that, he did take James Mill to task for neglecting the 
implications for the labour theory of a wage change not common to all types of labour:  “If a 
watch and a common jack altered in relative value without any more or less labour being 




proposition ‘that quantity of labour determines exchangeable value’ was universally true?  
What I call exceptions and modifications of the general rule you appear to me to say come 
under the general rule itself” (1951-73 9: 127).  In any event, Bailey’s charge that Ricardo 
refused to draw the implications of the formal recognition of heterogeneity (1825: 209-10) is 
unjustified.
60 
*     *     * 
Bowley complained that Mill, by his organization and weight of emphasis, unjustifiably 
played down the role of demand in price formation.  Thus he made “no attempt to point out 
the difference in importance of demand in determining price in [the increasing-costs] case 
compared to the constant cost case” with the result that the theory of value is made to “look 
simple” (1973: 168).   In this, she argued, he followed Ricardo rather than Senior (1836) and 
Bailey (1825), whose “efforts to explain the varied relationships between demand, cost of 
production and value certainly had none of that ‘appearance of lucidity’ which Marshall 
stigmatized as often ‘mischievous,’ nor did either of them advance ‘a plain and simple 
doctrine.’  In comparison, J. S. Mill’s treatment seems deliberately to evade the complex 
issues, in what might be described as a resolution ‘to find it easy’” (168-9). 
  There is a limited justification for this evaluation; for example, Mill refers on one 
occasion to “the operation of demand” in the general competitive case, as “the occasional 
disturber of value” (1963-91 3: 585), which neglects the variable-cost case.  But here Mill did 
not do justice to his overall position.  First, as early as 1828 in “The Nature, Origin, and 
Progress of Rent,” Mill had defended the differential-rent theory against the strictures of 
those “who affect to suppose that Sir Edward West, Mr. Malthus, and Mr. Ricardo considered 
the cultivation of inferior land as the cause of a high price of corn” (1963-91 4: 174).  Mill 
mentions no names but doubtless Senior 1821, Bailey 1825 and Thompson 1826 were 




effect of demand” was a doctrine “explicitly laid down by the distinguished authors 
previously referred to, and particularly by Mr. Ricardo.”  Similarly in the Principles:  “Mr. 
Ricardo does not say that it is the cultivation of inferior land” [that is the “cause of rent on the 
superior”], “but the necessity of cultivating it from the insufficiency of the superior land to 
feed a growing population” (1963-91 3: 428).  This is a perfectly justified defence of the 
Ricardian position with its full allowance for demand (cf. Hollander 1979: 665).  The analysis 
of a tax imposed on a decreasing-cost industry confirms vividly the emphasis on the role of 
demand in long-run price formation.  Once again, this episode reveals the illegitimacy of 
according to Bailey and Senior a perspective on demand foreign to the orthodox classicists. 
  Second, there is a definitional complexity to take into account, in that Mill says of 
products produced under increasing-cost conditions that “[t]heir value is not, correctly 
speaking, a scarcity value, for it is determined by the circumstances of the production of the 
commodity, and not by the degree of dearness necessary for keeping down the demand to the 
level of a limited supply” (490).  But this is not to deny a role for demand in the increasing-
cost case, Mill intending here by “scarcity value” a totally inelastic supply – and clarifying 
that where such prevails “both the land and its produce would really rise to a monopoly or 
scarcity price” under the pressure of demand (491).  In particular:  “It is also distinctly a 
portion of Ricardo’s doctrine, that … the land of a country supposed to be of uniform fertility 
would, all of it, on a certain supposition, pay rent: namely, if the demand of the community 
required that it should all be cultivated, and cultivated beyond the point at which a further 
application of capital begins to be attended with a smaller proportionate return” (428).
61 
  Also to be found in the secondary literature is the attribution to Bailey and Senior of a 
positive influence on J.S. Mill regarding “the classification of types of ‘imperfect 
competition’” (Blaug 1958: 167).
62  On the other hand, Bowley regards Mill’s emphasis on 




sophisticated than the barriers-to-entry classification of Bailey and Senior (1973: 169).
63  Yet 
the fact is that Mill’s analysis both of price and non-price competition turns strategically on 
the absence of barriers, whereas that of “monopoly” (strictly defined) and of imperfect 
competition requires them; in fact Mill took a major step forward by recognizing the 
implications for market structure of the “natural” barriers generated by scale economies 
(Hollander 1985: ….)  And all this apart from the adjustment of prices to cost in the standard 
(constant-cost) case where potential entry plays a key role ( … ), and from the analysis of the 
wage-rate structure where barriers are of the essence (…).  How much Mill may have learned 




VI  BAILEY AND MALTHUS 
  Malthus is frequently classed amongst the “dissenters.”  There is, of course, Jevons’s 
view of the nefarious effect of the Ricardo-Mill authority – “Economists such as Malthus and 
Senior, who had a far better comprehension of the true doctrines … were driven out of the 
field by the unity and influence of the Ricardo-Mill school” (above, p. …).  Blaug refers to 
“the critics and outspoken opponents of Ricardo,” having in mind “men like Malthus, Bailey, 
Scrope, Jones, Longfield, and Senior …” (above, p. …); and he says of Malthus that in the 
Definitions (1827), he “replied … to Bailey’s animadversions,” while “at the same time 
condemning the value theorizing of Ricardo, Say, Mill, and McCulloch so as to leave no 
doubt about his differences with the Ricardians” (1958: 56).  Rauner describes Malthus’s 
reaction in the Definitions to the Critical Dissertation as “most striking,” considering that 
“Malthus had something in common with Bailey in being generally out of step with the 
Ricardians” (1961: 118); but he goes on to explain that “Malthus actually proved just as 
inhospitable to Bailey’s message as the others,” though not because Malthus and the 
Ricardians were in the same theoretical boat” but because Malthus founded his own measure 
of value “on a conception of value dependent on causes of an absolute and inherent nature.”   
  I would say that while Rauner is perfectly correct to focus on Malthus’s defence of an 
“absolute” measure in responding to Bailey in Chapter 8 of his Definitions, he underplays the 
degree of common ground between Malthus and Ricardo.  And so a fortiori does Blaug in the 
above-cited reference.  McCulloch in brief, was perfectly correct when in his Encyclopaedia 
Britannica contribution of 1823, commenting upon Malthus’s Principles of 1820, he 
observed that while “[s]ome of the subordinate doctrines respecting value advanced by Mr. 
Ricardo in the first and second editions of his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 




to invalidate the leading principles established by Mr. Ricardo; and the alterations and 
corrections which the latter has made in the third edition of his work, have gone far to remove 
the objections of Mr. Malthus” (1823: 135).  That this is indeed so is clearly revealed not 
only by Malthus’s total rejection of Bailey’s position on “absolute” value, but also by his 
adoption of the Ricardian inverse wage-profit relation in the growth context in terms of his 
own labour-commanded measure of absolute value. 
  Malthus found particularly objectionable Bailey’s belief that “the only use of a measure 
of value, in the sense of a medium of comparison, is between commodities existing at the 
same time,” no relation being conceivable between the value of commodities over time (1986 
[1827] 8: 75f., citing Bailey 1825: 117).
64  In fact, those who made such comparisons did so 
with two possible ends in mind:  “They obviously mean either to compare the esteem in 
which a commodity was held at one period with the esteem in which it was held at another, 
founded on the state of its supply compared with the demand, and ordinarily on its costs of 
production; or to compare the general power of purchasing which a commodity possessed at 
one period with its general power of purchasing at another period” (77; also 81).  By this 
reference to “esteem” Malthus did not intend “utility”; esteem is indicated by the cost price 
of a commodity and it made sense to compare cost price in period t with cost price in period 
t+1, both expressed in terms of an invariable measure, or a commodity whose cost price – 
labour and profits – can be presumed not to have changed.   
  Over short periods money served both possible functions well enough:  “If the money-
price of corn has risen this year to double what it was in the last, I can infer, with almost 
absolute certainty, that corn is held in much higher estimation than it was.  I can [also] be 
quite sure that … it will command nearly double the quantity of all other commodities which 
are in their natural and ordinary state, and have not been essentially affected by the causes 
which have operated upon the price of corn” (77-8).




purchasing power is elaborated.  Notwithstanding the assertions in the Critical Dissertation, 
it was universally recognized 
that to estimate the relation of commodities, at different periods, in regard to their 
general power of purchasing, and particularly the power of purchasing labour, the 
main instrument of production, is a most important function …; and that, for 
moderately short periods, money does perform this function with very tolerable 
accuracy.  And for this specific reason; that, for moderately short periods, a given 
quantity of money will represent, more nearly than any other commodity, the general 
power of purchasing, and particularly the power of setting labour in motion, so vital to 
the capitalist (79-80). 
The advantage of the precious metals in the short period derived “from their great 
desirability, and the consequent uniformity of their supply in the market” (80).  Estimates of 
profitability made in terms (say) of corn could be disastrously misleading: 
Hops, or corn … will measure the relative values of commodities at the same time and 
place; but let the author or reader attempt to estimate the profits of a capitalist in hops 
or corn, by the excess of the value of his advances above the value of his returns so 
estimated, and he will soon be bewildered.  If a very plentiful year of corn were to 
succeed to a comparatively scarce one, the farmer, estimating both his outgoings and 
incomings in the corn of each year, might appear to gain above fifty per cent, while, in 
reality, he might have lost, and might not be able, without trenching on his capital, to 
employ as many men on his farm as the year before. 
At the same time, following Adam Smith, Malthus allowed that the precious metals will not 
serve over “very long” periods. 




differences with Ricardo are represented as differences of detail, not of principle; and the 
defence is prologue to a justification of his own measure.  His primary concern at this stage 
was simply to undermine Bailey’s contention that the Ricardo measurement procedure – 
entailing a commodity produced by a constant labour input – conflicted with the notion of 
value in exchange: 
“Suppose,” Bailey observes, “that we had such a commodity as Mr. Ricardo requires 
for a standard; suppose, for instance, all commodities to be produced by labour alone, 
and silver to be produced by an invariable quantity of labour.  In this case, silver 
would be, according to Mr. Ricardo, a perfect measure of value.  But in what sense?  
What is the function performed?  Silver, even if invariable in its producing labour, 
will tell us nothing of the value of other commodities.  Their relations in value to 
silver, or their prices, must be ascertained in the usual way; and, when ascertained, we 
shall certainly know the values of commodities in relation to each other; but in all this, 
there is no assistance derived from the circumstances of the producing labour of silver 
being a constant quantity” (82; citing Bailey 1825: 122). 
Malthus maintained in his defence of Ricardo that, given the foregoing assumptions, 
Ricardo’s silver served better than real silver over secular periods as an index of general 
purchasing power; for it “would be secured from that greatest source of variation in the 
general power of purchasing occasioned by the variation in its own producing labour; and an 
ounce of such silver would command much more nearly the same quantity of labour and 
commodities, for four or five hundred years together, than an ounce of silver derived from 
mines of greatly varying fertility.”  The same held good of the function of a measure in 
indicating changes in “estimation” over time of any given commodity – an allusion to cost 




make, in order to obtain such a commodity at … different periods; the relative conditions of 
the supply, or elementary costs of production, of such commodity at these periods; and the 
proportion of the produce to the producer, or the relative state of the demand, as compared 
with the supply of such commodity at these different periods” (83).  From an example that 
follows, it emerges again that, by “esteem,” Malthus refers essentially to the cost price of the 
commodity in question, doubtless because its cost price reflected the conditions of supply in 
the sense – as he had just put it – of the “sacrifice which people were willing to make in order 
to obtain it”: 
  It would not merely indicate, as the author states, in which of two commodities 
varying in relation to each other, at different periods, the variation had taken place 
[Bailey 1825: 121]; but it would express the precise amount of the variation; that is, if 
it appeared by documents that the price of a yard of cloth of a certain quality four 
hundred years ago was twenty shillings, and its price at present was only ten shillings, 
it would follow, that the estimation in which it was held, or its value, had fallen one-
half; because, as all commodities are, by the supposition, produced by labour alone, 
the sacrifice with which it could be obtained, the necessary conditions of its supply, or 
the elementary costs of its production had diminished one half. 
Malthus adds that variations of the Ricardian-money price of X would also show precisely 
variations of X’s command over other commodities “which had not altered in the conditions 
of their supply, or the elementary costs of production.” 
  Even accepting the labour-theory assumptions on which the Ricardo measure is based, 
there might occur changes in labour productivity throughout the economy, so that Ricardo’s 
silver could admittedly not provide “an accurate measure”:  “as the producing labour of 




quantity of any one object can, through successive periods, represent the same general power 
of purchasing” (83-4).  This led Malthus to propose that it were better “to confine the term 
value of a commodity, when used generally, to the estimation in which it is held, determined 
by the state of the supply compared with the demand, and ordinarily by the elementary costs 
of production, rather than to its general power of purchasing” (84).
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  Malthus commended Ricardo’s device, albeit that it only served as a precise measure of 
purchasing power if no changes occurred in labour productivity in the case of commodities 
other than the one under investigation; one might yet refer to a doubling in X’s “value” when 
labour productivity in X halves, although X’s general purchasing power would not double in 
the event of productivity changes in other products (85).  Smith too was right, using his 
standard of labour commanded, to talk of a rise in the secular “price” of cattle, though other 
commodities may rise simultaneously to an ever greater degree, reducing the general 
purchasing power of cattle.  Even Bailey, in dealing with “the causes of value,” found himself 
obliged “to estimate the causes affecting one commodity as distinct from the causes affecting 
another; although, according to his previous doctrine” – his formal insistence on relativities – 
“the value of one commodity might be just as powerfully affected by causes operating upon 
another commodity as by causes operating upon itself.”  Bailey had to concede “that to 
confine the term value … to the mere relation of any one commodity to any other, is to render 
it pre-eminently futile and useless” (86). 
*     *     * 
In all this, Malthus drew on both Ricardo and Smith for support of the concept of absolute 
value – pre-eminently the cost conditions affecting a particular commodity – against Bailey’s 
purely relativist position, although of course the absolute-value concept entails relativity in 
the use to which it is put.  We come now to his comments on Bailey’s chapter “On the 




  Malthus pointed to the fallacy of three of its presumptions:  (1) that “unless labour 
always exchanges for the same quantity of other things, its value cannot be invariable, and, 
consequently, the very supposition of its being, at one and the same time, invariable, and 
capable of measuring the variations of other commodities, involves a contradiction” (Bailey 
1825: 140); (2) “that to term anything immutable in value, amidst the fluctuations of other 
things, implies that its value at one time may be compared with its value at another time, 
without reference to any other commodity, which is absurd, value denoting a relation 
between two things at the same time”; and (3) “that in no sense could an object of invariable 
value be of any peculiar service in the capacity of a measure.”  Presumptions (2) and (3) were 
already shown to be unacceptable in Malthus’s defence of Ricardo.
67  As for (1), Malthus 
pointed out that the implication was ludicrous – namely, that labour rises or falls as a given 
portion of it will exchange for a greater or less quantity of silk or any other commodity, 
however unconnected with the labourer’s wants” (87). 
  With these preliminaries out of the way, Malthus came to a defence of his Measure of 
Value and its adoption of Smith’s labour-commanded measure of value.  As for its famous 
table – described by Bailey as “one of the most curious productions in the whole range of 
political economy” (1825: 142) – that was designed “further to illustrate the subject, and 
bring into one view the results of different suppositions respecting the varying fertility of the 
soil and the varying quantity of corn paid to the labourer …” (1986 [1827] 8: 88).  He 
rejected Bailey’s objection to the constant value of labour under these varying circumstances, 
that “in the same way any article might be proved to be of invariable value, for instance, ten 
yards of cloth.  For whether we gave £5 or £10, for the ten yards, the sum given would 
always be equal in value to the cloth for which it was paid, or, in other words, of invariable 
value in relation to cloth.  But that which is given for a thing of invariable value must itself be 




involved “either a most singular want of discrimination, or a purposed disregard of the 
premises on which the table is founded.”  These premises, of course, relate to the 
determinants of cost price: 
… that the natural and necessary conditions of the supply of the great mass of 
commodities, or, in other words, their elementary costs of production, are, the 
accumulated and immediate labour necessary to produce them, with the addition of 
the ordinary profits upon the whole advances for the time they have been advanced; 
and that the ordinary values of commodities at different periods, according to the most 
customary application of the term, are determined by the elementary costs of 
production at those periods, that is, by the labour and profits worked up in them. 
From these premises it followed that labour alone served as measure since no commodity 
could be said to constitute “the universal and the main instrument of production” or “the 
natural and necessary condition of the supply of all commodities” or one of the “elementary 
costs of production”; while no one had ever estimated the value of commodities over time 
“by the different quantities of cloth and profits worked up on them.”
68 A note is attached 
protesting at the common charge that he had arbitrarily selected labour as measure (89n). 
  Malthus, furthermore, refuted Bailey’s objection that the constant value of the wage 
irrespective of its quantitative magnitude or its “elementary cost” reflected a mere truism – a 
criticism also made by Ricardo and the younger Mill.  That constancy, he insisted, was rather 
a deduction from the preliminary proposition that the labour commanded by a unit of 
commodity X “represented” precisely the embodied labour therein plus profits on these 
advances, that is, its elementary costs.  In substance, Malthus sought first to justify his own 
version of the cost theory of value, and his position that labour commanded measures 




constancy of the value of labour: 
It would no doubt, be an absurd tautological truism merely to state, that the varying 
wages of a given quantity of labour will always command the same quantity of labour; 
but if it were previously shown that the quantity of labour which a commodity 
commands represents exactly the quantity of labour worked up in it, with the profits 
upon the advances, and does therefore really represent and measure those natural and 
necessary conditions of the supply, those elementary costs of production which 
determine value; then the truism that the varying wages of a given quantity of labour 
always command the same quantity of labour, must necessarily involve the important 
truth, that the elementary costs of producing the varying wages of a given quantity of 
labour must always be the same (89). 
  Malthus did not reproduce the full demonstration in his Measure of Value that the labour 
commanded provides the precise measure of labour embodied plus profits.
69  But assuming 
that proof to hold good, it followed that the “truistic” constancy of the value of (the labour 
commanded by) the wage, reflected the constant sum of labour embodied plus profits in the 
wage, such that any secular increase in the labour embodied in the wage would not – as 
Ricardo had it – imply that the wage was of higher value since that increase is precisely 
compensated by a reduced profit component: 
Mr. Ricardo had stated repeatedly, that the value of the wages of labour must 
necessarily rise in the progress of society.  He builds, indeed, the whole foundation of 
this theory of profits on the rise and fall of the value of labour.  The table shows that, 
if we estimate the value of wages by the labour worked up in them, that is, by one 
element of value, Mr. Ricardo is right, and the value of wages will really rise as 




labour and profits worked up in them, that is, by the two elementary ingredients of 
value, the value of wages will remain the same (89-90).
70 
Malthus, moreover, had in mind a criticism of versions of cost price which entailed reference 
to “labour and capital” rather than “labour and profits.”  Capital included both wage goods 
and real capital goods which are reducible to labour.  In fact, “excluding rent and taxes, the 
only elements concerned in regulating the value of commodities are labour and profits, 
including, of course, in such labour, the labour worked up in the raw materials, and that 
portion of the machinery worn out in the production; and including in the profits, the profits 
of the producers of the raw materials and machinery” (92).   
  Malthus proceeded to a bit of personal history in countering Bailey’s charge that “the 
table yields not a single new or important truth” (Bailey 1825: 150).  Allowing that the table 
per se did not yield any new truth, Malthus insisted that The Measure of Value as a whole – 
on which the table turned – certainly did, since “the view I there took of the subject of value, 
and of the reasons for adopting labour as its measure, was, in many of its parts, quite new to 
me a year before the publication” (1986 [1827] 8: 90). 
  The first novelty claimed was recognition that labour commanded measured labour 
embodied-cum-profits, transforming an original concern with the index as a measure of 
general purchasing power to an appreciation of its efficacy as a measure of production costs:   
… I had nowhere seen it stated, that the ordinary quantity of labour which a 
commodity will command must represent and measure the quantity of labour worked 
up in it, with the addition of profits ….  I had before considered labour as the most 
general and the most important of all the objects given in exchange, and therefore, by 
far the best measure of the general power of purchasing of any one object; but after I 




profits, it represented the natural and necessary conditions of its supply, or the 
elementary costs of its production, its importance, as a measure, appeared to me very 
greatly increased.
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  Malthus also, of course, claimed originality for the proposition relating to the constant 
costs of producing the wage – costs determined like those of any product:  “Secondly; I had 
nowhere seen it stated that, however the fertility of the soil might vary, the elementary costs 
of producing the wages of a given quantity of labour must always necessarily be the same.”  
This alludes to the property required of a measure expressed in 1819 by Torrens – in a 
formulation that delighted Bailey (see Appendix C) – which Torrens believed could not be 
fulfilled: 
Colonel Torrens, in adverting to a measure of value, says, “In the first place, 
exchangeable value is determined by the cost of production; and there is no 
commodity, the cost of producing which is not liable to perpetual fluctuation.  In the 
second place, even if a commodity could be found which always required the same 
expenditure for its production, it would not, therefore, be of invariable exchangeable 
value, so as to serve as a standard for measuring the value of other things.  
Exchangeable value is determined, not by the absolute, but by the relative, cost of 
production” (1819: 56; cited by Malthus 1986 [1827] 8: 91). 
Malthus thought of himself as meeting a challenge, provided that in dealing with variations in 
X’s command over Y or Z, one held constant the “causes” operating on X.  (The intrinsic 
causes of the Principles.)  But the cost conditions of producing the wage were necessarily 
constant, so that labour commanded constituted the sought-after X:  “In this case it is obvious 
that, according to Colonel Torrens, we should possess a measure of value if we could find an 




of Value “that the conditions of the supply of labour, or the elementary costs of producing the 
corn wages of a given number of men, estimated just in the same way as we should estimate 
the elementary costs of producing cloth, linens, hardware, or any other commodity, must of 
necessity always remain the same.”  These “two necessary qualities of the labour which 
commodities will ordinarily command” – we see Malthus’s preoccupation with equilibrium 
or long-run positions – were “practically new” to him, and made him “view labour as a 
measure of value, so far approaching towards accuracy, considering the nature of the subject, 
that it might fairly be called a standard.” 
*     *     * 
So much for the wholesale rejection by Malthus of the Bailey – or Bailey-Torrens – attack on 
the notion of a measure of absolute value.  This rejection reinforced Malthus’s long-standing 
support for Ricardo’s inverse wage-profit relation, as we shall now see. 
  As for Malthus’s adherence to the inverse theorem that is nicely spelled out in his 
Quarterly Review article for 1824 treating McCulloch’s Encyclopaedia Britannica 
contribution of the previous year:  “Of all the truths which Mr Ricardo has established, one of 
the most useful and important is, that profits are determined by the proportion of the whole 
produce which goes to labour.  It is, indeed, a direct corollary from the proposition, that the 
value of commodities is resolvable into wages and profits; but its simplicity and apparent 
obviousness do not detract from its utility” (1963 [1824]: 189).  Similarly:  “We fully agree 
with the author of the present treatise, that when it is said that profits depend on wages, they 
must not be understood to depend on wages estimated in money, in corn, or in any other 
commodity, but on proportional wages, that is, on the share of the commodities produced by 
the labourer, or of their value, which is given to the labourer” (199).  That Malthus accepted 




Value (1823).  Malthus had observed in the text that “it may be laid down … as a general 
proposition, liable to no exception, that when the value of any produce can be resolved into 
labour and profits, then as the proportion of such produce which goes to labour increases, the 
proportion which goes to profits must decrease in the same degree, and as the proportion 
which goes to labour decreases, the proportion which goes to profits must increase in the 
same degree …” (1957 [1823]: 28-9).  To this he added: 
This proposition is essentially the same as that which is very clearly and ably 
expressed by Mr Ricardo in his chapter On Profits in the following terms:  “in all 
countries and at all times profits depend on the quantity of labour requisite to provide 
necessaries for the labourers on that land, or with that capital which yields no rent”; a 
proposition which though incomplete in reference to the ultimate causes of the 
variations of profits, contains a most important truth.  From this truth the legitimate 
deduction appears to me to be, the constant value of labour; but Mr Ricardo has 
formed his system on a deduction exactly opposite to it.  He has, however, in my 
opinion, amply compensated for the errors into which he may have fallen, by 
furnishing us, at the same time, not only with the means of their refutation, but the 
means of improving the science of Political Economy (29). 
The criticisms alluded to in the foregoing passage relate to Ricardo’s (supposed) failure to 
deal satisfactorily with real (basket) wage-rate determination and to the issue of the 
appropriate measure of value, Malthus maintaining that his measure served better than 
Ricardo’s.  But one outstanding fact remains – Malthus’s insistence that by the relationship 
which he envisaged between the constancy of value of a given command over labour and the 





  These references are to observations made before the appearance of the Critical 
Dissertation.  But there is nothing to suggest that Malthus ever abandoned this position.  
Indeed, new support is offered for the inverse theorem in proportionate terms in the 
modifications introduced into the projected second edition of the Principles:  “whether the 
productive powers of labour are great or small, increasing, stationary, of diminishing … 
profits depend upon the proportion of the value of the whole produce, which goes to pay the 
wages of the labour employed to obtain them” (1836: 267); and “if labour be the measure of 
value, which I trust has been shewn, this is the same as saying that profits are determined by 
the proportion of the value of the produce which goes to pay the labour which has obtained it 
(291).
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  It also emerges from all this that Bailey’s insistence that the inverse relation only applies 
given labour productivity (above …) left no impression whatsoever on Malthus.  This is 
further confirmed by his adherence to the “shared incidence” principle whereby the profit rate 
declines during growth subject to increasing land scarcity despite a contemporaneous decline 
in the commodity wage, since proportionate wages necessarily rise.  On Malthus’s own 
reading, linguistic differences alone distinguished his own from Ricardo’s formulations:  
“When a given portion of labour and capital [1836: a given value of capital] yields smaller 
returns whether on new land or old, the loss is generally divided between the labourers and 
capitalists, and wages and profits fall at the same time.  This is quite contrary to Mr. 
Ricardo’s language.  But the wages we refer to are totally different.  He speaks of the cost 
[1836: mere labour cost] of producing the necessaries of the labourer; I speak of the 
necessaries themselves” (Malthus, 1820: 154; 1836: 152).




VII  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Bailey’s formal crusade against Ricardo faced considerably more hostility than 
Seligman, Schumpeter and other commentators imagine, even amongst the so-called 
“dissenters” – Malthus himself, so frequently classified uncritically as such, was positively 
hostile towards Bailey
74 – and a fortiori amongst Ricardo’s “votaries” including McCulloch 
who some moderns imagine to have been non- or even anti-Ricardian.  The Seligman-
Schumpeter view that the orthodox Ricardians had stifled the criticism, it also follows from 
our demonstration, is unjustified; so too is Blaug’s view that the orthodox “brushed aside” the 
criticism.  Neither position can account for the strong defence of Ricardo by Malthus, and the 
acceptance by Bailey and other dissenters of so much of the Ricardian doctrine.   
  Our results thus support James Mill’s judgment that Bailey’s analysis of the “nature of 
value” “makes profession, or rather ostentation, and parade, of being a controversy with Mr. 
Ricardo,” while it contained nothing of substance with which Ricardo would not have 
assented (above, p. …); and it provides the justification for Halévy’s judgment that “all the 
elements of [Bailey’s] criticism are borrowed from Ricardo’s book” (above, p…).  Yet 
caution is advised in this regard, for to “borrow” might be understood in the pejorative sense 
of blatant plagiarism, though one cannot be sure that Halévy intended to be so understood.  
And it may not be a justified charge, since there is always the possibility that Bailey did not 
read Ricardo carefully enough to appreciate the richness of the Principles.  Fortunately, we 
can to some extent go beyond surmise regarding these difficult matters; for there are some 
specific indications in our Section II regarding the character of the Bailey-Ricardo relation.  
We shall proceed for convenience in terms of Seligman’s attributions to Bailey laid out in 
Appendix A, though keeping in mind some features Seligman neglected to mention.   




conception, Bailey himself recognized in Critical Dissertation that Ricardo had taken the 
same view, and pointed this out in responding to his Westminster reviewer (James Mill) 
(above, pp. ….).  But in this regard Bailey does not emerge smelling of roses, for he takes 
word-mindedness to an extreme by complaining that Ricardo, concerned with the isolation of 
the source of observed changes in exchange ratios, ought not to have described such a 
concern as relating to the “measurement” of value (above, p…), in effect deflecting attention 
to a trivial matter of classification, while admitting the “truth” of Ricardo’s concerns. 
  A related issue of central importance (not mentioned by Seligman) is Bailey’s rejection 
of Adam Smith’s proposition that a general wage increase is passed on in higher prices on the 
basis of “the principles already advanced,” namely that since all capitalists are subject to the 
same disturbance no single capitalist can raise the rate of exchange of his commodity relative 
to any other (above, p. …).  Now this result is precisely what Ricardo established so 
conspicuously in the first chapter of his Principles, and it is difficult to imagine that Bailey 
could have been unaware of, or could have forgotten, this fact.  (He would, in any event, have 
been reminded by De Quincey 1970 [1824]: 62-3.)  
  To have spelled out this source would have been to admit that “the principles already 
advanced” were in fact Ricardo’s, and one might be inclined to suggest that it was for this 
reason that Bailey remained silent.  Yet the matter is more complex.  The Ricardian 
objections to Smith turn on the contrast drawn between disturbances such as a general wage 
change affecting all products uniformly and those affecting products differentially, the latter 
including wage changes pertinent to specific categories of labour (or specific taxes) or to 
general wage changes which have a differential impact because of non-uniform factor ratios, 
which Ricardo himself reduced to differential investment times.  And in fact Bailey explicitly 
recognized that Ricardo had allowed for these modifications to a pure labour theory (above, 




left by the discussion of Smith.  And yet Bailey continued to leave an impression of a 
breakaway from Ricardo even in the present context – vide, for example, his unjustified 
complaint that only in his Index did Ricardo qualify the general rule that products exchanged 
in strict proportion to relative labor inputs.  And, similarly, we have Bailey’s formal denial 
that goods exchange according to relative labor inputs in the increasing-cost case.  I refer here 
to his focus on costs at the margin, the labour embodiment in intra-marginal units of corn 
falling short (pp. …).  Now Bailey spells out that the marginal-cost principle itself is pure 
Ricardo – “the value of corn in general is determined, on his own principles, by the quantity 
of labour required to reduce corn on the worst soils in cultivation, and not by the quantity of 
its own producing labour” (above, p. …), – and he even praises Ricardo’s expression that 
value is not caused but regulated by marginal costs (above p. …).  Yet, notwithstanding, he 
directs the argument against the labour theory as if he were thereby striking out into virgin 
territory.  There is though a second device.  Thus at one point Bailey concedes that Ricardo 
“indeed, explicitly allows the influence of other causes” than labour quantity acting on 
relative value, but then deflects the criticism to apply to Ricardo’s followers (pp. …). 
  We turn to rent doctrine, first that rent emerges as a scarcity payment even should “all 
the land under cultivation [be] of equal fertility “(above p. …).  Did Bailey not then realize 
that Ricardo, had spelled this out explicitly in his Chapter 2 as well as the proposition that 
rent under certain conditions might be paid in industry (above, p. …)?  One cannot tell in this 
particular case whether Bailey was simply unaware that he was expounding Ricardian 
principles – for which there is little excuse, although he would be in good company – or 
simply chose to remain silent. 
  Of particular interest is Bailey’s insistence on what Seligman refers with admiration to 
something akin to, or consistent with, “the modern theory of the economy of high-wages,” 




profit-wage relation holding good only with output held constant (above, pp. …).  Here 
Bailey certainly claims originality, though he is in fact expounding pure Ricardian doctrine 
(pp. ….).  Now Ricardo’s efforts were directed at establishing that it is the proportionate 
share of wages in the (marginal) product and not the absolute wage that mattered in profit-
rate determination, particularly in establishing the inverse wage-profit theorem; and we know 
that Bailey recognized the validity of the fundamental theorem once assuming Ricardo’s 
terminological usage is adopted (above, p…).  It might then appear unlikely that he was 
unaware of the obvious implication for simultaneous increase or decease in absolute returns 
depending on alternative assumptions regarding output.  On the other hand, one soon learns 
that nothing can be taken for granted in intellectual history; so we must allow the possibility 
that he believed himself to be stating a novel proposition absent from the Ricardian canon.  
That, at least, is the most favourable construction to place on the episode. 
  Without question, the secondary literature – Seligman included – view Bailey as an anti-
Ricardo “dissident.”
75 We have shown the matter to be far more complex.  Though Bailey 
frequently sought – somewhat in the manner of J.-B. Say (see Hollander 2005) – to leave an 
impression of hostility towards the canon, when one attends to the details of the texts it 
emerges that he did appreciate  that most of his major propositions were already to be found 
in Ricardo’s Principles.  Indeed, his claims to fame in some contexts – including the 






EXTRACT FROM SELIGMAN 1903: 353-5 
  The following extract contains Seligman’s full summary of Bailey’s Critical 
Dissertation: 
  Since value is essentially relative in nature, Bailey objects to Ricardo’s attempt to 
discover a commodity of invariable value (1825:10).  To Bailey, Ricardo’s 
“contradiction involved in affirming the stationary or invariable value of an object 
amidst the variations of other things, is as direct and palpable” as to constitute a 
“strange and manifest error (16; cf. 30).  Malthus also is not free from the same 
mistake.  Furthermore, Bailey characterizes the alleged distinction between real and 
nominal value as “arbitrary and incapable of being turned to any use” (38).  Above all, 
he objects to the labour theory of the cause and measure of value.  Value according to 
Bailey, although often spoken of as a quality of external objects, really implies a 
“feeling or state of mind” (180).  This state of mind is a result of many circumstances, 
among which, indeed, cost of production is to be included as an important, though not 
the sole factor.  But even if we confine our attention to that class of commodities 
which is susceptible of increase and subject to the law of competition where the 
influence of cost of production is so great, it is not true that cost of production is 
resolvable into mere labour expended.  In the first place, it overlooks the co-operation 
of capital, which cannot be explained away by calling capital “accumulated or 
hoarded labour” (220).  “This is at best an aukward mode of expression, which can 
answer no good purpose.  When we accumulate we add one thing to another, and it is 
essential to the process, that both should remain in existence.  But labour, consisting 




brain, continually perishes in detail, and therefore admits of no accumulation.” 
  Furthermore, apart from this, labour cannot be considered as uniform.  Bailey asks:  
“What should we think of an assertion that coats are to each other in value as the 
quantities of cloth contained in them, or that their comparative value depends 
exclusively on the quantities of cloth required to make them” (221). 
  Above all, the exclusive stress laid upon labour neglects entirely the function of 
time in economic life.  Bailey tells us in almost the same language as Böhm-Bawerk:  
“We generally prefer a present pleasure or enjoyment to a distant one, not superior to 
it in other respects” (218).  He enters into a consideration of the importance of time in 
its effects on capital.  Time, like labour, is a “consideration which may influence both 
buyers and sellers,” and time cannot be resolved into labour (219). 
  So that even in the case of continuous production under competitive conditions, 
value is not resolvable into labour.  But there still remain two other great classes of 
commodities, those subject in part or in whole to the law of monopoly, and those 
subject to the law of diminishing returns (185).  This leads Bailey to a consideration 
of the law of rent, in the course of which he asserts the analogy between land rents 
and labour rents:  “The extraordinary profit out of which rent arises is analogous to 
the extraordinary remuneration which an artizan of more than common dexterity 
obtains beyond the wages given to the workman of ordinary skill….  In the one case 
this monopoly is bounded by the existence of inferior soils, in the other of inferior 
degrees of dexterity” (196-7). 
  Here we have the first attempt to generalise the doctrine of rent, an attempt which 
has usually been associated in English, at all events, with Senior.  Over a quarter of a 
century before Mangoldt and Schäffle, we thus find in Bailey this broadening of the 




into price” as at the best vague and indefinite, as “one that ought to be banished from 
the science” (198). 
  Finally, it must be noticed that Bailey is the first to put his finger on the real fallacy 
of the doctrine that wages and profits must vary inversely.  This error consists in 
neglecting the fact that “the value of labour does not entirely depend on the proportion 
of the whole produce which is given to the labourers in exchange for their labour, but 
also on the productiveness of labour” (63).  “The proposition, that when labour rises 
profits must fall, is true only when its rise is not owing to an increase in its productive 
powers” (64). . . . “If the productive power of labour be augmented, that is, if the same 
labour produce more commodities in the same time, labour may rise in value without 
a fall, nay, even with a rise of profits” (66).  This, it will be seen, virtually contains the 





SAMUEL BAILEY AND TWO ANONYMOUS CONTRIBUTIONS OF 1821 
  The authorship of Observations on Certain Verbal Disputes in Political Economy (1821) 
remains to be ascertained.  Marx noticed similarities between this pamphlet and Bailey’s 
Critical Dissertation and charged Bailey with plagiarism (1861-63: 299, 312, 347).  Bailey 
himself feared he might be subjected to such accusation:  “This Book exhibits some striking 
coincidences with my Treatise on Value – so striking that I might possibly incur the charge of 
plagiarism if any one compared the two works.  The truth is however that I did not see this 
pamphlet till my own book was published” (Dennis 1973: 17, citing Bailey’s private notes, 
held in the University of Edinburgh, undated).  Dennis gives cogent reasons to accept 
Bailey’s disclaimer (18). 
  The Cass edition of Bailey’s works (1967), however, includes the pamphlet and Sowell 
1970 makes out a positive case for Bailey as author, which applies also to the Inquiry into 
Those Principles Respecting the Nature of Demand and the Necessity of Consumption Lately 
Advocated by Mr. Malthus:  “Comparing the Observations and the Inquiry with other works 
known to have been written by Samuel Bailey, there is a remarkable range of similarities and 
no significant differences.  These similarities may be grouped in four broad categories:  (1) 
discussions of the role and importance of words in economics, (2) value theory, (3) 
methodology, and (4) opinions of economics and of particular economists.  There are also 
certain stylistic similarities between these two anonymous works and Bailey’s other writings” 
(1970: 402; also 1972: 131-4).  Sowell 2006 reaffirms this attribution with respect both to 
Verbal Disputes (2006: 233n 89: 234 n91, 102: 239 n26; 247nn 124, 129; 248 n143) and to 
the Inquiry (141; 216n 61; 230 n44; 248n 137; 267 nn50, 51; 269n 81).  Unfortunately, 




denial of plagiarism and a fortiori of authorship, or the case against Bailey as author 
convincingly elaborated in O’Brien and Darnell 1982: 86-9.  (O’Brien and Darnell propose 
Brougham as probable author.)  Rauner had, in any event, long before cast doubt on Bailey as 
author of Verbal Disputes (1961: 89 n43). 
  More challenging is the Inquiry.  As mentioned, Sowell 1970, 2006 make out a case for 
Bailey.  So too in this case do O’Brien and Darnell (1982, Chapter 5).  But their conclusion 
turns on an application of a statistical analysis (91-107), called into question (Stigler 1983).  
O’Brien and Darnell write of a “widespread belief that Bailey was the author of this work 
[the Inquiry]” (1982: 90), but this surely is to exaggerate.  Rauner 1961, 1987 make no such 
attribution and – like Verbal Disputes – it remains unattributed in the Kress and Goldsmiths’ 
collections.  Seligman himself made no attempt at attribution.  Schumpeter takes no note at 
all of the Inquiry; and while Verbal Disputes is described as a “main contribution” it is not 
ascribed (1954: 599n).  As for Bailey:  “The only publication of his that needs to be 
mentioned is A Critical Dissertation …” (486n).
76  
  There are two further considerations pointing away from Bailey’s authorship of the 
Inquiry.  First, Dennis contrasts Bailey’s denial in his notebooks of authorship with respect to 
the Verbal Disputes with the (apparent) absence of references to the Inquiry:  “the 
presumption of Bailey’s authorship of the latter should thereby be weakened inasmuch as the 
textual linkages between the two pamphlets of 1821 are at least as strong as those between 
the Inquiry and Bailey’s accredited works” (1973: 17).  Second, Sowell – who argues for 
Bailey’s authorship of both 1821 pamphlets – himself allows that the fact that the Verbal 
Disputes and the Inquiry “failed to appear in any of [the lists of selected earlier works which 
appeared in Bailey’s later works] presents a difficulty” (1970: 408).   




Bailey (Hollander 1998: 261).  But though, in the light of the foregoing complexities, it now 
seems unlikely that the Inquiry is by Bailey, it is of high importance that the quest for 
authorship continue since Seligman was unjustified in describing the pamphlet – along with 
Verbal Disputes – as “of minor importance” (1903: 351).
77  As a conspicuous instance of its 
significance, we find expressed in the clearest terms the simultaneous fall in both wages and 
profits characterizing the “canonical” growth model, the shared incidence attributable to 
increasingly scarce land and a rising corn price. 
Supposing the degree of inclination to save and gain on the part of the capitalist, and 
to labour and to increase on the part of the labourer, to remain unaltered, or both to 
increase in equal proportions, the effect of increased cultivation in raising 
permanently the price of corn, would be borne partly by the labourer and partly by the 
employer:  the labourer’s [money] wages would not be raised in fully equal proportion 
with the price of corn, nor would they, on the other hand, remain quite stationary:  
profits would indeed fall, but the amount of the labourer’s command of food would 
also be somewhat abridged (1821: 25). 
The author further clarifies that the profit rate varies with proportionate wages; 
simultaneously high (low) profit and wage rates are quite consistent in conditions of high 
(low) productivity: 
Now where a little labour will produce a great deal, especially where it will produce a 
great deal of food in one country, compared to what it will in another, it is possible, 
that the proportion in which the produce is divided may be, in the former, more 
favourable to the employer than the latter, and, in the sense, profits may be said to be 
higher; and yet what the labourer gets may be more of absolute subsistence and 




latter:  and in that sense, wages may be said to be higher.  This is, probably, the case 
in America (100). 
  Although the author of the Inquiry adopted a land-scarcity explanation of profit-rate 
trends and rejected Smithian “competition of capitals” (9f, 13f, 18), he unfortunately ignored 
Ricardo’s contribution to the canonical model wherein the real wage is necessarily above the 
subsistence wage throughout the expansion process.  Thus, he cites first Ricardo’s chapter on 
Profits:  “There cannot be accumulated in a country any amount of capital which cannot be 
employed productively … until wages rise so high in consequence of the rise of necessaries, 
and so little consequently remains for the profits of stock, that the motive for accumulation 
ceases” (19), and allows only that Ricardo recognized “temporary” increases in the wage, 





A NOTE ON BAILEY’S OBLIGATIONS 
  The matter of Bailey’s debt to Ricardo has been touched on in our concluding section.  
Other candidates must include Ricardo’s avowed students – his “votaries” – pre-eminently 
perhaps De Quincey whose Dialogues 1824 discusses the character of relative, as distinct 
from absolute,  value from which Bailey might have benefited (e.g. 1970 [1824]: 80), and 
elaborates the proposition that a general wage increase cannot be passed on by producers to 
the extent that all employers are affected equally (62-3). There is too McCulloch’s strong 
rejection of an invariable measure of exchangeable value which also appeared in 1824: “If 
you are to measure the value of any one commodity, you must measure it by the agency of 
some other commodity possessed of value, just as when you measure length or capacity the 
measure which you use must itself have length or capacity. But as the circumstances under 
which every commodity is produced are always liable to perpetual change,  it is clear to 
demonstration that none can be selected which can ever form an invariable measure or 
standard of value; though, as some commodities are much less variable than others, they may 
be used as rude approximations” (McCulloch 1824: 114). (Cf. McCulloch 1825: 212-14 for a 
corresponding formulation made after the appearance of the Dissertation, and which pays 
some tribute to Bailey (above, note 48).  It is even conceivable that Bailey drew from J.S. 
Mill’s “[v]alue is a relative term …” (above, p. …), for Mill’s formulation appeared in the 
January 1825 issue of the Westminster Review and the Critical Dissertation was only 
published in June.   
  We turn to predecessors noted by Bailey himself – apart from the anonymous Verbal 
Disputes (see APPENDIX B).  These include Lauderdale, whose Inquiry (1804) – using the 




commodities between themselves,” and who is cited approvingly by Bailey:  “We cannot 
express value, or a variation of value, without a comparison of two commodities” 
(Lauderdale, 2nd ed. 1819: 19, cited 1825: 4; 1st ed. 1804: 21).  And in A Letter to a Political 
Economist we find: “The impossibility of a measure of invariable value has been … 
maintained by the Earl of Lauderdale, Col. Torrens, and others …” (1826: 14).
  (In this 
context, it will be recalled, Bailey in fact also cites Ricardo on the “impossibility of finding 
any commodity of invariable value,” reminding James Mill that this had been explicitly 
recognized in the Critical Dissertation itself; above, pp….). 
    By his mention of Torrens, Bailey intended the case made out in 1821 regarding the 
inconceivability of a measure of exchange value.  This is clear from the Critical Dissertation: 
“After these critical strictures [against Ricardo, Malthus, and De Quincey], it is a pleasure to 
cite a passage from an author, whose views as to the nature of value appear to me to be 
sounder than those of any other writer” (1825: 32): 
… even if a commodity could be found which always required the same expenditure 
for its production, it would not therefore be of invariable exchangeable value, so as to 
serve as a standard for measuring the value of other things.  Exchangeable value is 
determined, not by the absolute, but by the relative cost of production.  If the cost of 
producing gold remained the same, while the cost of producing all other things should 
be doubled, then would gold have a less power of purchasing all other things than 
before; or, in other words, its exchangeable value would fall one half; and this 
diminution in its exchangeable value would be precisely the same in effect, as if the 
cost of producing all other things remained unaltered, while that of producing gold 
had been reduced one half.  In the very term, exchangeable value, a relative, and not 




purchasing all other things, then all other things would have a greater or a less power 
of purchasing gold.  It is impossible to increase the exchangeable value of one set of 
commodities, without at the same time diminishing the exchangeable power of the 
other set of commodities with which the first is compared (1821: 56-7). 
There is, however, no actual expression here of “debt” on Bailey’s part. 
  Bowley draws attention to the extension of the rent concept to the income from fixed 
capital by Craig 1821 (Bowley 1937: 131n; see also Williams 1978: 48); and, more generally, 
she maintains that “[t]hroughout his criticisms the influence of Say is very marked, and 
Bailey was in fact criticizing certain sections of Ricardo’s system in the light of Say’s general 
results” (93), an assertion, the evaluation of which would require a book in itself.
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  Of potential importance as a “source” – though not formally recognized by Bailey – is 
Senior’s “Report on the State of Agriculture” 1821 (see above, p. …).  The following extract 
contains several propositions close to those found in Critical Dissertation (above, pp….), 
including rent as “monopoly” price, an emphasis on demand-supply as “cause” of a high corn 
price with the corn raised at greatest cost only “regulating” the price of all corn units, and – in 
particular – the observation that the price of a random unit of corn will not reflect its “own” 
labour input:  
The sums … received by the landed proprietor are, of course, what is called rent. They 
are the surplus profit obtained from the investment of capital in land over that 
obtained from its investment in any other business; and they are occasioned by each 
portion of raw agricultural produce being raised at a different expense, and each 
portion, except that raised at the greatest expense, selling at a monopoly price, the 
difference between which price, and the natural price, is taken by the proprietor of the 




not previously paid a remunerating price to the grower,[79] for rent is the excess of 
price above the remunerating price…. 
        We have observed that there is a portion of corn, that raised at the greatest 
expense, of which the price roughly coincides with the cost of production.  And it has 
been said, that as it is the price of that portion which governs that of all the remainder, 
the price of that remainder is likewise governed by the cost of production.  But first, 
when we say that the price of any  thing is governed by the cost of production, we 
mean the cost of its own production, - not of the production of any thing else.  And, 
secondly, to say that it is the price of this last portion of corn, which governs that of 
the remainder, is to mistake the effect for the cause. The price of other corn does not 
rise because the last portion has been produced as a greater expense, but the last 
portion is produced, because the proportion of supply to demand has previously 
occasioned such a rise in the price of the corn already produced, that additional capital 
laid out in producing additional corn, at a greater proportionate expense, will return 
the average profit of capital.  Corn does not become dear, because a portion is raised 
at great expense, but a portion is raised at a great expense because corn has already 
become dear.  
            The last step in agriculture will always be the application of fresh capital to 
land already in cultivation. The corn produced by it is intended to sell for its natural 
price; and this price must previously have been, and must continue to be, that of all 
other corn, or the last application of capital would not have been made, - would have 
been greater, - or would not be continued.  And it is in this sense only, (and it must be 
acknowledged to be very obscurely pointed out,) that the corn raised at the greatest 
expense can be said to fix, or govern, or regulate the price of all other corn; not as an 




the same quality will sell for the same price: and, therefore, if you find the natural 
price of the corn which is produced, and continued to be produced, at the greatest 
expense, you find the market price both of that corn and of all other corn (Senior 
1821: 474-6). 
  One other “predecessor” deserves special mention.  Seligman, in discussing Read’s 
position, refers to the “Labour Theorists” (1903: 518), but neglects to mention William 
Thompson, whose discussion of value includes the conceptions of differential land use, 
alternative cost and scarcity value; and who applies the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility (together with the principle of increasing marginal disutility of effort) in an attempt to 
define an equilibrium wage rate, and also in a calculation of the effects of income 
redistribution (Thompson 1824: 71-3).  The significance of free exchange is clearly expressed 
in utility terms:  “All voluntary exchanges of the articles of wealth, implying a preference, on 
both sides, of the things received to the thing given, tend to increase the happiness from 
wealth, and thence to increase the motives to its production” (45).  And whereas labour is 
said to be the sole measure of value, it was not an accurate measure in the light of changes in 
preference patterns over time; to seek an accurate measure was “to hunt after a shadow” (15).  






 A further suggestion for the long-term ineffectualness of the “dissenters” is their failure to 
enter into practical policy issues (Seligman 1903: 534-5). 
2. See also Sowell:  “If there is a classic of criticism in economics, it must be Samuel 
Bailey’s A Critical Dissertation…” (1970: 402). 
3. 
 Schumpeter in fact implies resilience of the Ricardians in the mid-1840s:  “Writing in 
1845, McCulloch did not risk provoking laughter when he wrote in his Literature of Political 
Economy that Bailey had not properly appreciated the Ricardian theory [of value] and had not 
‘succeeded in any degree in shaking its foundations,’ in the face of the fact that a poll of 
writers on value from 1826 to 1845 would produce a considerable majority for Bailey.” 
4.  Mixter treats the issue of monetary appreciation in Bailey 1837, on which see below, p…. 
5.
 At only one place in his book does Schumpeter take issue with Seligman:  “Professor 
Seligman was in error when he allocated to Lloyd the proud position of having been the first 
thinker in any country to advance what is known today as the marginal theory of value, and to 
explain the dependence of value on marginal utility” (1954: 1055). 
6.  See below, p… on the Bailey-Senior relation. 
7. See also Bowley 1937: 93; Rauner 1961: 5-6; Black 1988: 224. 
8. Cf. O’Brien 1975, 2004, where Bailey is referred to as “author of a brilliant if negative 
survey of value theory” (7; ….), and as “provid[ing] a damaging critique of Ricardo’s value 
theory though he had relatively little positive to contribute himself” (48; ….). 
9. 
 Blaug argues the case for the resilience of “Ricardian” economics, but understands by the 
term “the proposition that the yield of wheat per acre of land governs the general return on 




“The rate of capital formation was still held to be governed by returns in agriculture, and the 
core of the Ricardian system, the law of diminishing returns, continued to dominate the body 
of economic thought” (61).  As an early reviewer remarked, “[t]he role of this component of 
Ricardo’s theory is much exaggerated” (Stigler 1959: 641).  O’Brien too identifies the “full 
Ricardian apparatus” with the “Corn Model” (1975: 41; 2004: 48). 
10. Malthus actually precedes the comment cited by referring to Bailey’s “fundamental 
errors” – he was himself not impressed.  On this matter, see below section VI. 
11. It is of interest that a political scientist should describe Bailey as “a Ricardian in 
economics, an empiricist in metaphysics, an advocate of representative government, a 
utilitarian in ethics, and a fervent champion of complete freedom of discussion” (Quincy 
1986: 6).  Unfortunately, we cannot say what this author understands by “Ricardian.” 
12.
 For the attribution to Mill see Rauner 1961: 149-57, Fetter 1962: 584; O’Brien and 
Darnell 1982: 108-28.   
13.
. Schumpeter, we recall (see note 3), also mocks McCulloch’s remark in the Literature of 
Political Economy “that Mr. Bailey does not properly appear to have appreciated the 
Ricardian theory of value, or to have succeeded in any degree in shaking its foundations” 
(1845: 33).  Schumpeter might have added to his amusement by reference to De Quincey 
whose Dialogues of Three Templars (1824) had stimulated Bailey to compose his Critical 
Dissertation (1825: xxiv-xxv).  The object of this early work, De Quincey later observed, had 
been “to draw into much stronger relief than Ricardo himself had done that one radical 
doctrine as to value by which he had given a new birth to Political Economy” (1844: 119).  
And while he had been pleased with the attention given to the work by Bailey, nevertheless 
“with all his ability, that writer failed to shake any of my opinions.  I continue to hold my 





 This and the following sections elaborate specific features of two earlier papers devoted 
to the dissenting literature as a whole (Hollander 1977, 1998).  A modification to Hollander 
1998 regarding the Bailey canon, is discussed in Appendix B. 
15. Bailey recognized the priority in this regard of Torrens, on which see Appendix C. 
16. For an appreciation of this point, see Fraser 1937: 119n; cited however as being in error 
by Rauner 1961: 94-5.  (See also, Bladen 1938: 31, with respect to Smith and Malthus.)  For 
Rauner, “it was Bailey’s perception of the inconsistency between real and relative value that 
had struck at the heart of Ricardo’s system” (91; also 64, 98, 102). 
17. A particularly interesting formulation occurs in a draft of Ricardo’s final paper, the 
unpublished “Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value,” where Ricardo formulated a 
criticism of Torrens (who identified a fall in the value of corn with a rise in the value of 
money) in terms that he doubtless would have applied to Bailey’s objection to the conception 
of “real,” “natural,” “positive,” or “absolute” value, that is, the “difficulty of production,” in 
turn identified (usually) with labour embodiment:  “This language may be correct as he uses 
it to express only exchangeable value but in Political Economy we want something more [;] 
we desire to know whether it be owing to some new facility in manufacturing cloth that its 
diminished power in commanding money is owing, or whether it be owing to some new 
difficulty in producing money.  To me it appears a contradiction to say a thing has increased 
in natural value while it continues to be produced under precisely the same circumstances as 
before” (1951-73 [1823] 4: 374-5).   
18. 
 Sowell exaggerates therefore when he writes that “Bailey rejected the Ricardian notion of 
a measure of value as designating the original cause of a change in relative values” (1970: 
404).  




terms of “value” as labour embodied or, more generally, costs.  (See, for example, the 
discussion of De Quincey (1826: 12-13).)  Much of this work is designed to show, by 
citation, that – pace the Westminster reviewer – Ricardo was inconsistent and unclear in his 
terminological usage (29f).  For a discussion of the Letter, see Rauner 1961, Chapter 6. 
20. Rosenstein-Rodan points out correctly that “the classical distinction between changes in 
the value of money originating on its side and changes in its value originating on the side of 
commodities” reflects “the theory of real value” (1936: 263).  This theory, he opines, “has 
been vigorously exposed in the brilliant book of S. Bailey….  But the distinction was so 
generally accepted that Bailey himself fell back into it in his otherwise very valuable book:  
Money and its Vicissitudes in Value … 1837: 16-17.” 
  Bailey’s Money – not mentioned by Seligman – is of the highest importance, especially 
for its analysis of “accelerated circulation” as means of activating “inert” or “dormant” or 
“unemployed” capital and labour (1837: 55f.), an analysis appearing in print seven years 
before J.S. Mill’s “Of the influence of Consumption on Production” (Mill 1963-91 [1844] 4: 
262-79).  Mill makes no reference to this analysis; Marx cites it at length in his Grundrisse of 
1857-58 (MECW 28: 502-4). 
  The book also contains much of interest regarding banking policy, Bailey arguing 
against control of note issues. 
21.
 A little earlier in his text Bailey had forcefully rejected strong statements of the labour 
theory by James Mill, De Quincey and McCulloch (1825: 207-8). 
22. 
 This is ironic, since the index was probably compiled by James Mill, not Ricardo himself 
(see Sraffa in Ricardo 1951-73 1: xxi-xxii).  It is difficult to see how Ricardo could have 
played up the “qualifications” more than in the heading to his Section IV in Chapter 1:  “The 




their relative value, considerably modified by the employment of machinery, and other fixed 
and durable capital” (30; emphasis added).  
23.
 See also, below p. … for a further instance of Ricardo’s generalization of the rent 
principle. 
24. An indication of the ineffectualness of the “mental” dimension is provided by the 
following note:  “Value implying, as I have before shown, a mental affection, and 
consequently all causes of value being, in reality, circumstances affecting the mind, it might 
be more correct to speak of the causes operating on the mind with regard to an object, than of 
the causes operating on the object itself; but the latter is a shorter mode of expression, 
sufficiently intelligible, and not likely to lead into error” (1825: 16n). 
25. For the defence of Torrens against James Mill’s strictures, see Bailey 1825: 203f. 
26.  On this issue, see in particular Bowley 1973: 161-9; Williams 1978: 62-7. 
27. Recall that the rate of accumulation, for Ricardo, is a function of the profit rate (1951-73 
1: 122).  
28. The Critical Dissertation, we have seen, emphasizes a simultaneous rise in both the profit 
and wage rates in the case of increasing productivity.  What though of the simultaneous fall 
in both assuming declining productivity, a characteristic feature of the canonical classical 
model?  Certainly the former implies the latter, but Bailey failed to spell the matter out in his 
1825 contribution.  This takes us to the 1821 Inquiry where the joint-incidence principle is 
spelled out, though to this day it is uncertain whether or not Bailey is the author (see 
Appendix B). 
29. For a brief account of Cotterill, see Rauner 1961: 129-32. Rauner writes that Cotterill’s 




similar issues to those in our text.  See also: “C.F. Cotterill (1831) and H.D. Macleod (1863, 
1866) both praised Bailey’s work and used his treatment of the nature and measure of value 
in their own studies” (1987: 174). 
30. In his chapter dealing with the causes of value, Bailey had distinguished between 
“commodities which are monopolized, or protected from competition by natural or 
adventitious circumstances”; those “in the production of which some persons possess greater 
facilities than the rest of the community, and which therefore the competition of the latter 
cannot increase, except at a greater cost”; and those “in the production of which competition 
operates without restraint” (1825: 185).  The general notion is that “their respective causes of 
value cannot be the same.” 
31.  On Ricardo’s according a special role to labour in Read’s sense, see Hollander 1979: 
263-4. 
32. The same kind of criticism is directed by Read against Lauderdale’s Inquiry of 1804.  
Any attempt “to reduce the idea of value to a mere relation of commodities between 
themselves, without any connexion with mankind, with labour, or with cost of production” is 
fatal, since “the connexion of the exchangeable value of commodities with labour and cost of 
production is indeed the only circumstance which confers any importance on the connexion 
of the exchangeable value of commodities between themselves” (1829: 221). 
     Extraordinary as it may seem Read went so far as to charge the “Ricardo School” for 
following Lauderdale’s lead in emphasizing utility and scarcity or supply-demand rather than 
cost analysis (220-1). 
33. 
 For a downplaying of Bailey’s influence on Read, see also Rauner 1961: 128; O’Brien 
1988: 199. 




whereas in fact she expresses herself with extreme caution regarding Bailey’s influence on 
Senior with respect to the theory of value.  Bowley 1973: 161-7 provides a detailed 
comparison of the two writers. 
35. See also: 
  Although Senior did not acknowledge the writings of Bailey (nor of Jones, Read, 
or Scrope for that matter), his influence is writ large in Senior’s book.  It is evident in 
the generalization of the rent concept and in the attack on the assumption of “perfectly 
equal competition”:  whenever an appropriated natural agent concurs in the 
production of a commodity the value of such an article contains a “rent” payment 
which is not governed by any general rule.  Since the assistance of natural agents may 
comprise all the advantages of soil or situation, personal talent and skill, patents and 
copyrights, most commodities are not really subject to the laws of competitive value 
[Senior 1836: 103-14] (Blaug 1958: 157). 
Blaug’s position is accepted by O’Brien 1988: 195, 198. 
36. For the attribution to Senior, see Fetter 1958: 159.  Seligman makes no mention of the 
1821 paper.  Bowley only mentions it in her Preliminaries (1937: 21) and in her Appendix 
where its attribution to Senior in the Dictionary of National Biography is mentioned (344). 
     J.S. Mill refers in 1827 to this article, in the course of an objection to T.P. Thompson’s 
“The True Theory of Rent” (1826):  “Mr. Thompson does not perceive that his theory of rent 
differs from that of Mr. Ricardo only in the expression.  There is no difference in the 
principle, and we cannot but think, that, even in the mode of stating it, Mr. Ricardo has 
decidedly the advantage” (1963-91 4: 151n).  He goes on to refer to Senior’s priority:  
“Moreover, if the case were otherwise, and if Mr. Thompson’s theory were a real discovery, 




been said previously in a single paragraph, and much more clearly, by the Quarterly Review, 
No. 50, pp. 475-6, in an able article attributed to the present Professor of Political Economy 
in the University of Oxford” (151-2n). 
37.
 Mill alluded in 1828 to those “who affect to suppose that Sir Edward West, Mr. Malthus, 
and Mr. Ricardo, considered the cultivation of inferior land as the cause of a high price of 
corn” (1963-91 4: 174).  The argument that “the cultivation of inferior soils is not the cause 
but the effect of high price, itself the effect of demand” was, he insisted, a doctrine “explicitly 
laid down by the distinguished authors previously referred to, and particularly by Mr. 
Ricardo.”  Mill may have had in mind Senior 1821 and/or Bailey 1825. 
38. On Mill’s intentions by this declaration, see below, p. …. 
39. Here he controverted a Westminster Review article on colonization plans, by showing that 
“when the productive powers of industry are increased there may be, at one and the same 
time, an increase, both in profits, and in wages” (1835: 33-4), insisting that this did not refute 
Ricardo when interpreting the inverse profit-relation correctly as relating to proportionate 
shares expressed in ideal money (30).  
40. Torrens admitted Ricardo’s use of “obscure and equivocal nomenclature,” but the 
substance of his theory held good that “profits rise or fall as the cost of producing wages is 
diminished or increased” (1844: xxxv-xxxvi).  
41.
. See the passage cited, below (V: p. …). 
42. The Critical Dissertation is highly critical of Mill, as we shall see, but Bailey’s earlier 
Questions in Political Economy (1823) is very positive, Mill perhaps receiving more credit 
than any other contemporary. Thus Commerce Defended (1808)  provided a “full and 




sources of the wealth of nations” (Bailey 1823: 20-1). And the Elements – “an excellent 
elementary book” – is cited favourably on the benefits derived from imports (21-2), as 
providing “a most able discussion of the disadvantages of interference in the corn trade” – a 
discussion constituting “the summing up of a luminous mind” (31), as presenting the case 
against “gluts” in a manner Malthus could not refute (39-44), as containing “excellent 
Sections on Money” (69) and an “excellent” analysis of the effects of colonies on the mother 
country (89), and as giving the proper response to Hume on the alleged benefits of 
inflationary injections (74-5). Mill’s analysis of exchange value, which represents “demand-
supply” as accounting for short-run and “costs” for long-run price, is said to be “so clear and 
concise, that it will be generally considered as a satisfactory solution to the problem” (99). 
The issue, Bailey adds, “applies to ‘such commodities only,’ to borrow the words of  
Mr.Ricardo, ‘as can be increased in quantity by the exertion of human industry, and on the 
production of which competition operates without restraint.’ Monopolized commodities are 
acknowledged, on all hands, to depend upon the principle of supply and demand”(100).Only 
with respect to population theory is there some demurring, for while the Elements is 
recommended as presenting a “brief and clear elucidation,” Mill had not “chosen the most 
striking set of arguments to support the doctrine…”(13).  
43.  Technically, Mill errs.  In a system subject to increasing land scarcity, the proportionate 
share of labour necessarily rises as the real wage declines – for it is the necessary rise in 
labor’s share in the marginal product, notwithstanding the decline of the wage in real terms, 
that depresses the profit rate.  For all that, this passage implies a falling wage path during the 
course of growth.  This is further confirmed by Mill’s policy prescription which is to assure a 
reduction in the birth rate while wages are still “ample,” thereby preventing any further 




to capital from the land was yet high, the reward of the labourer would be ample, and a large 
surplus would still remain” (1821: 52; 1824: 68; 1826a: 65).  The alternative, considering 
“the natural tendency of population to increase faster than capital” – and this Mill purported 
to establish – was a “perpetual tendency in wages to fall” until an equilibrium is achieved 
(1821: 29; 1824: 45; 1826a: 45).  Again, though Mill is technically in error, for the wage falls 
even if capital and population decelerate in tandem, he does describe a falling wage path.  I 
warmly recommend these passages to the attention of Dr. Peach, who has opined that there is 
not “a single instance in Mill’s Elements of the so-called shared-incidence principle” (Peach 
2007: 314). 
44.  Torrens actually asserted that Mill “gives up” the doctrine that profits rise or fall … in all 
cases except in those in which the terms are used, not according to their accustomed 
acceptation but with reference to proportions” (1826: …).  This is misleading, since Mill 
identified the proportions and the rate-of-return cases” – the latter being the “accustomed 
acceptation” – and insisted on the validity of the inverse relation in such cases.  It is in terms 
of quantity that the relation did not hold good unreservedly and Mill believed that no-one had 
ever said otherwise (see above, p. …regarding Mill 1826a: 74).  On this latter point, see 
Robbins 1958: 55n. 
45.  Bailey commended Mill for introducing in his second edition (even before De Quincey) 
the contrast between a measure and cause of value, but charged him with inconsistent usage, 
referring to Mill 1824: 108 (1825: 171n, 205n).  Mill made no adjustment in his third edition 
(1826: 113). 
46. Bailey points out sarcastically that the “credit of this argument … is due to Mr. 
M’Culloch, whose authority is cited by Mr. Mill” (1825: 217n).  For Ricardo’s objections to 




4: 375-6.)   
47.  The conditions were already formulated in the first edition of the Elements ( Mill 1821: 
82), Mill presumably drawing upon Ricardo’s third (1821) edition of the Principles (1951-73 
1: 43-6).  The 1824 version is, however, much extended and one suspects that Mill benefited 
from Ricardo’s draft “Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value,” the language of which 
resembles that of Mill:  “By far the greatest number of commodities which are the objects of 
exchange are produced by the union of capital and labour’ rather than by the “extremes” 
(Ricardo 1951-73 4: 405). 
48.  See also: “That Bailey made little impact on McCulloch is clear from the continuity 
between an article which McCulloch published in the Scotsman in 1824 (February 21) on 
exchangeable value, and the position which he took in the first edition of his Principles” 
(O’Brien 1970: 138). Yet allowance must be made for McCulloch’s tribute in 1825: “The 
conditions essential to the production of an invariable measure of exchangeable value were 
first clearly pointed out in the Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value, 
p.17. (1825: 214n). Also to be taken into account is  a possible impact of McCulloch on 
Bailey, on which see below p. 91. 
49.  The “objections” relate to analysis of the effects of a change in the profit rate. 
50.  The Principles was published in December 1825 and the Critical Dissertation in June 
(see English Catalogue of Books, 1914: 166 cited Rauner 1961: 86n). 
51.  Ricardo’s paraphrase in the 1823 correspondence of McCulloch’s position reveals his 
own position, that to understand the “law” of exchange value was a necessary preliminary to 
specifying the invariability conditions required of a measure of value: 




value, his only object is to know what it is which regulates the relative value of 
commodities one to another, and that, he insists, is the quantity of labour necessary to 
produce them.  But McCulloch uses the word labour in a sense somewhat different to 
Political Economists in general, and does not appear to me to see that if we were in 
possession of the law which regulates the exchangeable value of commodities, we 
should be only one step from the discovery of a measure of absolute value (letter of 31 
August 1823; Ricardo 1951--73 9: 377). 
52. Elsewhere the term “real wage” indicates the commodity wage, as on 1825: 365 cited 
below, p…n). 
53. It may also be noted that for both, even should the level of prices rise in consequence of a 
wage increase, the purchasing power of profits necessarily falls so that the fundamental 
theorem still held good (McCulloch 1825: 297; Ricardo 1951-73 1: 8).  
54.  For example, with capital = 1000 qs (or £1000), of which wages = 500, non-wage capital 
(seed etc) = 500 yielding 1200, then profits = 200 or 20% and profit/wages = 2/5.  With a 
doubled yield but retaining a 2/5 profit-wage ratio of the additional output, profits rise by 2/7 
(1200) = 343 to 543 and wages by 5/7 (1200) = 857 to 1357.  As shares of net output (output 
less constant non-wage capital = 500), wages remain at 71%, and profits at 29%; but the rate 
of profit estimated on total capital rises from 20% to 543/1000 = 54%. 
  In another example, McCulloch assumes initially a “capital” of 10,000 quarters (= 
£10,000) entailing seed, fodder, wear and tear of equipment = 5,000 + wages = 5000 yielding 
12,000 qs, of which 1,000 = taxes, then net profits = 1000 = 10% on capital.  If, ceteris 
paribus, wages fall by 1000, then profits will rise from 1000 to 2000 or from 10 to 20%; if 
taxes fall ceteris paribus from 1000 to 500, profits will rise from 100 to 1500 or from 10 to 




wages at the original 5000) will rise from 1000 to 2000 or to 20%.  The last case is the most 
significant, for  
though, in this case, after the increased productiveness of industry had taken place, 
wages would form a less proportion of the whole produce of industry than they had 
done previously, it is to be observed, that this diminished proportion is the 
consequence, and not the cause of profits having risen; and, therefore, in such cases as 
this, and they are of very frequent occurrence, it is true to say, that the fall of 
proportional wages has been occasioned by the rise of profits; but the converse of the 
proposition is not true, for profits rose from causes that had nothing whatever to do 
with wages, and which were, in fact, totally independent of them (370). 
  There also arose the possibility that the profit rate remains unchanged though 
proportionate wages – the wage share in output – rise.  For example, with capital = 1000 
composed of 500 seed etc, 500 wages; output = 1200; taxes = 100; then profits = 100 or 10%. 
Assume that new technology permits the same output with 400 seed and assume also wages 
rise by 100 then (given taxes) profits are unchanged though proportional wages rise from 
5/12 to 6/12 of the aggregate output (371-2). 
55. In this context, McCulloch uses the term “real wages” to indicate the commodity wage as 
distinct from proportional wages:  “If the productiveness of industry were to diminish, 
proportional wages might rise, notwithstanding that real wages, or the absolute amount of the 
produce of industry falling to the share of the labourer, might be diminished:  and if, on the 
other hand, the productiveness of industry were to increase, proportional wages might be 
diminished, while real wages might, at the same time, be increased” (1825: 365).   
  For an exchange regarding the falling commodity-wage path as a feature of classical 




56. This view is repeated in Blaug’s textbook 1978: 206, but is apparently subsequently 
removed (1997: …). 
57. On this linkage, see Tucker 1960: 96. 
58. Rauner, while claiming an apparent influence by Bailey upon Mill is cautious.  He points 
out that “Bailey had not been alone in seeking the generalization of the rent concept.  But he 
had been among the first and foremost advocates of it in England.  And if Mill, perhaps, drew 
more directly from Senior than Bailey, this is not to say that Senior himself was unaware of 
the Critical Dissertation, although he never explicitly referred to it” (1961: 140). 
59. Mill goes on to explain that “I first heard of [Some New Principles] from Mr. Senior who 
recommended it to me as a book of which he had a high opinion…” (1963-91 14: 241).  
When the information was conveyed is not specified, but evidently it was sometime before 
1848.  Senior’s own influence on Mill’s Principles appears to be limited to forms of 
expression.  For example:  “As the wages of the labourer are the remuneration of labour, so 
the profits of the capitalist are properly, according to Mr. Senior’s well-chosen expression, 
the remuneration of abstinence….” (1963-91 2: 400).  There is no mention at all of Senior in 
the chapter “Of the Law of the Increase of Capital,” and none in “Of Profits” apart from the 
above-cited definition. 
60.
 On Bailey’s charge, see De Quincey 1844: 269-70. 
61.  For Ricardo’s formulation, see above, p…. 
62. But Blaug’s textbook for some reason omits this feature (1985: 220; 1997: 212). 
63.  On this classification, see Bowley 1973: 161-9; Williams 1978: 62-7. 
64. For criticism of this feature, see Bode’s reference to Bailey’s Chapter V, “On Comparing 




intertemporal comparison of the value of a commodity must be meaningless….  [I]n all cases 
where the periods in question fall within the scope of one plan, intertemporal comparison of 
value is not only possible but is essential to the rationality of this plan” (Bode 1935: 344).  
The deficiency is ascribed in part “to the fact that Bailey did not recognize the essence of 
subjective value as that of an index of degree in the subjective economic scale….”  Also see 
Robbins:  “Bailey overstates his case to this extent, that he does not mention prospective 
value relations through time (1935: 60n).  This is to be generous, since Bailey denied the 
meaningfulness of intertemporal value comparisons. 
65. As for general purchasing power, the relation was asymmetric.  A variation in the money-
corn exchange rate would not indicate that the general purchasing of money had changed:  
“Broad, glaring, and incontrovertible facts show, that for short periods money does perform 
the function of measuring the variations in the general power of purchasing possessed by the 
corn; but that the corn does not measure the variations in the general power of purchasing 
possessed by the money” (1986 [1827] 8: 78).  This point is made against Bailey’s position 
(1825: 117) that money would not “be here discharging a particular function more than the 
other commodity” (also 81, regarding Bailey 1825: 102). 
66. Cf:  “It is universally acknowledged that there cannot be an accurate measure [of general 
purchasing power].” 
67. The objections to the latter two are readily summarized.  Bailey implied by them what 
was patently untrue:  “Secondly, that the value of corn in one year cannot be compared with 
the value of corn in another, because value denotes only a relation between two things at the 
same time.  And thirdly, that the comparative steadiness in the value of the precious metals, 
for short periods, is of no service to them in the capacity of a measure of value” (1986 [1827] 
8: 87).




68. In the 1823 correspondence Ricardo had objected that commodities, not labour, are in fact 
advanced (1951-73 9: 381). 
69. 
 That “proof” starts out by positing the identity of labour embodied and commanded; and 
then modifies the situation by allowing for capital (or time) so that a profit element has been 
included, which implies an excess of labour commanded over labour embodied. 
70. Given Malthus’s objectives, it would have been preferable had he reworked his table.  
The table as it stands is misleading since it commences with a known profit rate and appears 
to build up to column 7 – the constant value of the wage.  His true position – at least in the 
1827 version – is that the profit rate emerges from the constancy of the wage.  This is better 
conveyed by commencing with the constant value of the wage at (say) unity and then 
allowing for different labour inputs into the wage (owing to changes in the magnitude of the 
basket and/or changes in labour productivity) with profits yielded as the residual.  This in 
contrast to Ricardo’s procedure which sets a day’s labour as “unity” and derives profits as a 
residual varying inversely with the fraction of a day’s labour embodied in the wage. 
71. See also above regarding 1986 [1827] 8: 83-4.   
72. I do not maintain an identity of the Ricardo and Malthus positions.  The differences 
between them – which include, apart from the dispute over the measure of value, alternative 
causal sequences and alternative perspectives on the aggregate demand problem – are spelled 
out in Hollander 1997: Chapter 10.  
73. See Ricardo’s agreement with Malthus on the falling commodity wage in his Note 61, in 
1951-73 2: 124.  He insisted, however, that the money value of the lower commodity wage 
necessarily rises only with the Ricardo measure. 




too far in his rejection of the orthodox position relating to growth subject to land scarcity (de 
Marchi and Sturges 1973: 385-6, 389). 
75. This view has filtered down.  Thus a New School web site 
(cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/anti.htm) has the following under Samuel Bailey:  “Pointed 
out the logical difficulties of both the labor theory of value and Ricardo’s ‘invariable 
measure.’  An early promoter of the theory of scarcity and the generalization of the Ricardian 
theory of  rent, thus can be considered a precursor of the Marginalist Revolution.”  
76. Schumpeter does add a reference to Bailey’s Letter to a Political Economist (1826), as 
responding to “a grossly unfair criticism in the Westminster Review,” the review now known 
to have been written by James Mill. 
77. It is not clear that Seligman read the pamphlet carefully; see the comment by Sraffa in 
Ricardo 1951-73 9: 27n, regarding Seligman 1903: 351.  
78. As an example of the complexities involved, consider the fact that despite Say’s 
representation of the invariable standard as a “pure chimera,” he nonetheless actually adopted 
Malthus’s measure – which Bailey, of course rejected.  On this matter, see Hollander 
2005:43. 
  The analogy between land rents and payments to skilled labour exceeding reimbursement 
of training costs, is to be found in Storch 1823 (see Williams 1978: 48). 
79. “In its proper sense the remunerating price of any thing is its natural price – the price 
which replaces the capital employed in its production with the average profit of capital at the 
same time and place” (Senior 1821:474).  
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